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Sec.udicial District Court - Latah County -
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2017-0000230 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Amstad, Daoiel C 
User: TONYA 









































New Case Filed, Citation Import 
Prosecutor assigned Erin E. Tomlin 
Arraignment / First Appearance 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
Defendant: Amstad, Daniel C Order Appointing 
Public Defender Public defender Latah Co. Pub. 
Def. --D. Ray Barker 
Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
CHARLOTTE Order Appointing Public Defender John C. Judge 
CHARLOTTE A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (I37-2732(d) John C. Judge 
Controlled Substance-Frequenting Place where 
Used, Manufactured, Cultivated, Held, Delivered, 
Given) 
CHARLOTTE Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference John C. Judge 
03/07/2017 03:00 PM) . 
CHARLOTTE Hearing Scheduled (Attention 06/15/2017 05:00 John C. Judge 







Response To Request For Discovery 
Request For Discovery 
Continued (Pretrial Conference 03/28/2017 
03:00 PM) 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled John C. Judge 
on 03/28/2017 03:00 PM: Continued 
CHARLOTTE Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
04/04/2017 03:00 PM) 










Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 
04/27/2017 03:00 PM) 
John C. Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Attention 04/24/2017 05:00 John C. Judge 
PM) Motion to dismiss filed, hearing set for 
4/27/17 
Notice Of Hearing John C. Judge 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled John C. Judge 
on 04/04/2017 03:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Subpoena Returned - CHRISTOPHER HUGHES John C. Judge 
Subpoena Returned - NOAH A SHARP John C. Judge 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO John C. Judge 
DISMISS 
Supplemental Response To Defendant's Request John C. Judge 
For Discovery 
Hearing result for Attention scheduled on John C. Judge 
04/24/2017 05:00 PM: Attention Handled Motion 
to dismiss filed, hearing set for 4/27 /17 0-0 U :it)!{) {G 
Date: 1/26/2018 
Time: 11 :02 AM 
Page 2 of 3 
Sec-Judicial District Court- Latah County -
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2017-0000230 Current Judge: John C. Judge 
Defendant: Amstad, Daniel C 
State of Idaho vs. Daniel C Amstad 
Date Code User 
4/27/2017 DSAT MYRANDA Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled 
on 04/27/2017 03:00 PM: Dismissal At Hearing 
CTMN MYRANDA Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled 
I 
on 04/27/2017 03:00 PM: Court Minutes 
.ATNV MYRANDA Hearing result for Attention scheduled on 
06/15/2017 05:00 PM: Attention Vacated 
SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE -Arraigned on 2/15/2017 
DSAT MYRANDA Dismissal At Hearing (I37-2732(d) Controlled 
Substance-Frequenting Place where Used, 
Manufactured, Cultivated, Held, Delivered, Given) 
FJDE MYRANDA Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
HRSC MYRANDA Hearing Scheduled (Attention 05/11/2017 05:00 
PM) Order granting mtn & dismissing case filed? 
4/28/2017 ATNH JAN Hearing result for Attention scheduled on 
05/11/2017 05:00 PM: Attention Handled Order 
granting mtn & dismissing case filed? 
ORDR JAN ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
5/5/2017 NSSC JAN Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel 
PROS JAN Prosecutor assigned William W. Thompson Jr. 
5/10/2017 NAPL BETH Notice Of Appeal 
6/8/2017 TRAN TERRY Transcript of Hearing of Motion to Dismiss 
·NOTC TERRY Notice of Lodging of Transcript 
HRSC TERRY (Attention 06/29/2017 08:00 AM) Transcript is 
settled, prepare briefing schedule) 
6/29/2017 HRSC TERRY Hearing Scheduled (Appellate Argument 
10/30/2017 09:30 AM) 
7/6/2017 ORDR TERRY Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Scheduling 
Oral Argument 
8/7/2017 BREF TONYA Appellant's Brief 
User: TONYA 
Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John C. Judge 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
Date: 1/26/2018 
Time: 11:02AM 
Page 3 of 3 
Sec.udicial District Court - Latah County -
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2017-0000230 Current Judge: John c.·Judge 
Defendant: Amstad, Daniel C 
State of Idaho vs. Daniel C Amstad 
Date Code User 
9/5/2017 BREF TONYA Response to Appellant's Brief 
Brief 
10/30/2017 DCHH TERRY Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled 
on 10/30/2017 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Sheryl L. Engler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 35 pages 
CTMN TERRY Hearing result for Appellate Argument scheduled 
on 10/30/2017 09:30 AM: Court Minutes 
12/1/2017 MEMO PEGGY Memorandum Opinion on Appeal 
12/19/2017 HRSC PEGGY Hearing Scheduled (Attention 01/10/2018 08:00 
AM) Terry Odenborg Reminder to prepare 
remittitur 
1/2/2018 NAPL TONYA Notice Of Appeal 
User: TONYA 
Judge 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
John R. Stegner 
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DAHO UNIFORM CITATION -In the court designated below the undersigned certifies that he/she has just 
and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that on: 
t ·CR044060S- gRo4!osos 
---l.._ Date/Time: 01/30/201711:04 PM DR#: 17-M01054 · '.> ,~ 
M WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF MOSCOW CA'.<. ~ (;o, I -D c)..::::[J 
\ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 2ND 
.__ JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF LATAH, STATE OF IDAHO, 
I VIOLATOR 
Last Name: AMSTAD Ml: C 
First Name: DANIEL DOB:
Hm. Address: 1001 PARADISE CREEK #813 Hm, Phone: 2084842603 
City: MOSCOW State: ID Zip: 83843 
Eyes: BRO Hair: BRO Height: 6'3" Weight: 160 Sex: M 














License Plate: 1A2B515 
Model: ACC 
Style: 40 
USDOT TK Census#: 
Upon a Public Street or Highway or Other Location Namely: 




Did unlawfully commit the following Offense(s), In violation of State Statute, 
Infraction Citation: N Misdemeanor Citation: Y Hazmat: N 
GVWR 26001+: N 16+ Persons: N Comm, Veh.: N 
Posted Speed: Observed Speed: 
Date/Time: 01/30/2017 11:04 PM 
Violation #1: CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE-FREQUENTING PLACE 






I COURT INFORMATION 
MAGISTRATE COURT 
PO BOX8068 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
Court Date: 02/15/2017 
Court Time: 8:30 AM 
I SIGNATURE 
Dept.: 





I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on 01/30/2017 
Signature of Officer: _______________ _ 
Officer name: JOE SIEVERDING Officer ID: 135 
Agency Name: CITY OF MOSCOW POLICE DEPARTMENT 








This Is a MISDEMEANOR charge in which: 
Note: If you fail to appear within the time allowed for your appearance, another charge 
of failure to appear may be filed and a warrant may be issued for your arrest. 
1. You may be represented by a lawyer, which will be at your expense unless the 
judge finds you are indigent. 
2. You are entitled to a trial by Jury if requested by you. 
3. PLEA OF NOT GUil TY: You may plead not guilty to the charge by appearing 
before the clerk of the court or the judge, within the time allowed for your 
appearance, at which time you will be given a trial date. 
4. PLEA OF GUil TY: You may plead guilty to the charge by going to the clerk of the 
court, within the time allowed for your appearance, at which time you will be told if 
you can pay a fixed fine or whether it will be necessary for you to appear before 
the judge; OR you may have your fine determined by a judge at a time arranged 
with the clerk of the court, within the time allowed for your appearance. 
5. If you plead guilty, you may still give an explanation to the judge. 
6. You may call the clerk of the court to determine if you can sign a plea of guilty and 
pay the fine and costs by mail. 
I plead guilty to the charges. _______________ _ 
Defendant (if authorized by clerk of magistrate court) 
IF this is a citation for failure to have insurance: 
If you admit the charge or are found to have committed the charge, your driver's 
license will be suspended until you pay the fixed penalty, provide proof of 
insurance to the Driver's Services Bureau of the Department of Transportation 
and pay a reinstatement fee. 









AMSTAD WAS IN A PARKED VEHICLE GETTING READING TO 
USE MARIJUANA FROM A BONG. -
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT <::a-iE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE A 
STATE OF IDAHO, I-JD FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH '9' 
D STATE OF IDAHO, ABSTRACT OF COURT RECORD AND DOCKET 
...,S CITY OF «:'nSC('")W DISTRICT COURT CASE No.(P-·d:)17-0?EiJ 
Plaintiff . ·\_ 
Vs t J - . I . I _ I.C./City Code 3J-~ (d .J 
~f er·-AJ:n$ro,ef Offense }::Ye#-,· p/o [(} CCJ'l•l-+'Df \R£ hig_{Q 
Defendant Amended Offensl! _______________ Amended Code _____ _ 
D.O.B. 
DISPOSmON BY COURT · · 
Complaint Filed. Uniform Citation# c.fl-CJ-11.JD(;,0,5 Signed by ..\, S, 1(:J..,'-ev-ct.£):v; 
D State D County i:llity of ('>-"\0.SC.QC-0 D POE D F & G :::) 
Criminal Complaint signed by ____________ before Judge _______________ _ 
D Bail set at $ ______ Warrant Issued ( ) D Summons Issued ( ) Appearance Date ______ _ 
Probable cause hearing set for __________ _ 
Defendant failed to appear as directed in the summons; a verified complaint was filed and the Court issued a warrant of arrest for 
defendant. Bail was set at$ _________ . ( ) 
D~ndant appeared before Magistrate ::::Ji¾-t . was informed of his rights and was read the charge. 
~ ~ ,)it'appointed to represent defendant D Repay )I No Repayment 
___________________ D retained by defendant 
BAIL OF DEFENDANT: 
D Def. Committed bail posted. Bail set: $_____ D Defendant ROR. 
D $ ______ __,,osted D Cash D Surety Bond No. _________ D Other: ________ _ 
D $ _______ exonerated$ __________ refunded to _________ _ 
PLEA OF DEFENDANT: 
Continued at request of defendant/court until / /at _______ for plea. 
,;,;;;. -'-S-D. Appearance made Din wri_!ing D by phone c:ir'in person by ii?ciefendant D ______ ..,,.... __ on behalf of defendant 
and pied D guilty 8'1ioi: guilty. Pre-trial set for ~~ -:\7 ;!;.." t::}r';,, o'clock~ .M. 
No contact order issued. Exp. .Reissued. ____ . Exp. ' . Reissued. ____ . Exp. . 
PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL 
'",::::J-.c:l D Pre-Trial continued to 3-J. 16-n pl 3'.lu !) 
34ff-n Bil Pre-Trial continued to 4!:-/::0@ '3 '.O(l 
D Pre-Trial continuectto ________ _ 
at_,_.M. 
atL.M. 
at __ .M. 
D Pre-Trial continued to _______ _ at .M. 
D Pre-Trial continued to _______ _ at .M. 
D Pre-Trial continued to _______ _ at __ .M. 
D Pre-Trial: -------------------------------------
Dismissed. Reason-----------------------------------
0 Jury Pre-Trial Conference/Motions scheduled for ______________ at ______ .M. 
D Jury Pre-Trial Conference continued ~-~---...,...,-,.-,-.,.....,~~~-----at ______ .M. 
g Motion Hearing scheduled for i-/ )N-d€) )7 @.3 '.m~fi\.- at ___ --- .M. 
D Jury Trial continued to ___________________ at .M. 
D Court D Jury Trial scheduled for at .M. 
D Court D Jury Trial held ____________ at___ __ .M. Defendant found D Guilty D Not Guilty 
JUDGMENT: mD\i(il\-n:Jb.:Sll'li~ ~i:½ 
Defendant to appear for seotp.pciog/statw;. on q-;:p- I 1 at _____ .M continued to ____ _ 
Court ordered JUDGMENT WITHHELD. Defendant ordered to pay $ _________ in lieu of fine and costs by ___ _ 
which $ ____ was suspended on conditions below; Serve ___ days in jail; ___ days suspended on conditions below 
JUDGMENT was pronounced. Fine:$ _____ including$ ___ costs, Serve _____ days in jail;$ ____ of 
fine and ___ days in jail suspended on conditions below. 
D Credit given for time already served ___ days. 
D Fine and costs paid. Receipt. No. ___ _ FINE DUE 
D $, _____ of bond applied to case _________ _ 
D Paid from Bond.$ _________ refunded to ____________________ _ 
D Defendant's driver license suspended for days from _________ _ 
D Defendant's Hunting/Fishing License suspended _________________ _ 
D No Court License Suspension. 
CONDmONS OF JUDGMENT OR WITHHELD JUDGMENT: 
PRINTCRAfTPRINTING 
D Defendant on unsupervised/supervised probation until ______________________ _ 
D Defendant shall not violate any laws excluding traffic infractions. 
D Send a letter to the Court each month that arrives by 5:00 p.m. on the first Monday of each month that is dated and signed and 
lists home and work addresses and telephone numbers and case number and states (a) if violated laws; (b) if consumed or 
possessed any alcohol; (c) if entered any bars or liquor stores. _____________________ _ 
D The defendant shall not consume or possess any alcohol or controlled substances unless lawfully prescribed. 
D The defendant shall submit to searches of person, property, residence, vehicle as reasonably requested by probation officer. 
D The defendant shall not enter any bars or liquor stores. 
D The defendant is subject to testing to ensure compliance. 
D The defendant is not released from probation until performance has been reviewed. 
D Defendant ordered to pay restitution to ______________ in the amount of$ _______ _ 
If completes _________ and provides proof to the Court by the Court will strike $ ____ _ 
(DATE COMPLETED _______ ~ $ ________ STRICKEN) 
If shows proof of damages being paid by ________ strike $ ______ _ Date Stricken ____ _ 
If provides proof of a valid drivers license by _______ strike$ ______ _ Date Stricken ____ _ 
D Other Conditions or Proceedin ~ --~---------------------------
·-;'.l (I 
Dated this.~--- day of _______ ~ 20 
Clerk of Court 
By _________________ deputy 
000012 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Daniel C Amstad 
1001 Paradise Creek #813 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Defendant. 
- -Second Judicial District Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Latah 
522 S. Adams 














ZD 17 FEB 15 P.M 10: 36 
sy _____ DEPUTY 
Case No: CR-2017-0000230 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Daniel C Amstad, _and it appearing to be a proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
Latah Co. Pub. Def. --D. Ray Barker 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow ID 83843 
Public Defender for the County of Latah, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Daniel C Amstad, in all proceedings in the above entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that he/she may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appointed counsel. 
Copies to: 
~ _ _public Defender 
£Prosecutor 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Deputy Clerk 
DOC30 10/88 
Erin E. Tomlin 
Prosecuting Attorney 
City of Moscow 
PO Box 9203 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone:. (208) 883-7003 
Fax: (208) 883-7018 
ISB #9035 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL blSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 









Case No. CR-2017-00230 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
TO: THE DEFENDANT, DANIEL C. AMSTAD, 
and Counsel, D. Ray Barker; 
COMES NOW, the State in the above-entitled matter, and submits the following Response 
to Request for Discovery. 
The State has complied with such request by providing the following: 
1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies 
thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known or 
is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of 
any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after arrest to a peace officer, 
prosecuting attorney, or the prosecuting attorney's agent have been disclosed or otherwise made 
available. 
2. Any written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance of any 
relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest in response to 
interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the 
prosecuting attorney, have been disclosed or otherwise made available. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY ORIGINAL 
> 
3. Defendant's prior criminal record, if any, has been disclosed or otherwise made 
available. 
4. Any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places, 
or copies or portions thereof, which are in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecuting 
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense or intended for use by the 
prosecutor as evidence at trial or obtained from or belonging to the Defendant have been disclosed 
or otherwise made available. In addition officers from the Moscow Police Department and other 
law enforcement agencies may record their law enforcement contacts via an audio recorder or 
audio/video recorder. Any audio and video recordings related to this matter are available for 
review and duplication on request, subject to the provisions of !.C.R. 16(b)(9). Pursuant to said 
subsection, and except as otherwise specified herein, any such digital media is unredacted and may 
contain protected information, thus further distribution is restricted by I.C.R. 16(b)(9)(A), unless 
the State provides express written consent or by the order of the Court. 
5. Any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or 
experiments, made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, 
custody, or control of the prosecuting attorney, the existence of which is known or is available to 
the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence have been disclosed or otherwise made 
available. 
6. A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of 
relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial has been or will be provided 
separately in accordance with I.C.R. 16(b)(6). Any record of prior felony convictions of any such 
persons which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney and all statements made by the 
prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the 
prosecuting attorney's agents or to any official involved in the investigatory process of the case 
have been disclosed or otherwise made available. Additionally, the State rriay call as witnesses 
anyone otherwise identified or referred to in reports, statements, or other documents referred to in 
this response. 
7. Any written summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce 
pursuant to Rule 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing, have been or 
will be disclosed or otherwise made available. This response does not necessarily include 
disclosure of expert witnesses, their opinions, the fact and data for those opinions, or the witness's 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
qualification, intended only to rebut evidence or theories that have not been disclosed under this 
rule prior to trial. 
8. Any reports and memoranda in possession of the prosecuting attorney which were 
made by any police officer or investigator.in connection with this investigation or prosecution of 
this case have been disclosed or otherwise made available. 
9. All material or information within the prosecuting attorney's possession or control 
which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to 
reduce the punishment therefore have been disclosed or otherwise made available. In addition, 
with regard to material or information which may be exculpatory as used or interpreted, the State 
requests that the defendant inform the State, in writing, of the defense which will be asserted in 
this case, so counsel for the State can determine if any additional material or information may be 
material to the defense, and thus fulfill its duty under I.C.R. 16(a) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963). 
10. Tue State objects to requests by the Defendant for anything not addressed above on 
the grounds that such requests are outside the scope ofl.C.R. 16. 
11. Wherever this Response indicates that certain evidence or materials have been 
disclosed or otherwise made available, such indication should not be construed as confirmation 
that such evidence or materials exist, but simply as an indication that if such evidence or materials 
exist, they have been disclosed or made available to the Defendant. 
12. Pursuant to I.C.R. 160), if the State subsequently discovers additional evidence or 
evidence of additional witnesses, or decides to use additional evidence or witnesses, the State will 
promptly notify the defendant and the Court. 
DATED this }) day of February, 2017. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
Erin E. Tomlin, Prosecuting Attorney 
PAGE30F4 
--
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Request for 
Discovery was: 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
--~'/hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney for Defendant 
Courthouse Mail 
Moscow, ID 83843 
~ 
Dated this I~ day of February, 2017. 




Attorney at Law 
- -
D. Ray Barker Law Office 
204 East First Street 
BY ___ ~ "-_,_ ________ '...J:.:.;~u·:y 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-6749 
Idaho State Bar No. 9515 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











TO: Moscow City Prosecutor's Office 
Case No. CR-2017-230 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of information, evidence and materials as 
follows: 
a. That said defendant be permitted, in person and by his attorney, to inspect and copy or 
photograph any relevant written or recorded statement made by the defendant or copies thereof 
within the possession, custody, or control of the state, the existence of which is known or is 
available to the Prosecuting Attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and also the substance of 
any relevant oral statement made by the defendant, whether before or after arrest, to a peace 
officer, prosecutor or his agent or other representative of the state. 
b. That said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to be furnished with 
a copy of said defendant's prior criminal record, if any, as is now or may become available to the 
Prosecuting Attorney. 
c. That the defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to inspect or copy or 
photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places, or 
copies of portions thereof, which are in the possession or control of the Prosecuting attorney 
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which are material to the preparation of a defense or intended for use by the Prosecuting 
Attorney as evidence at trial obtained from or belonging to the said defendant. 
d. That the defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to inspect and copy 
or photograph any result or reports of physical, psychological or psychiatric examinations and/or 
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the above-entitled case, or copies thereof 
within the possession, custody or control of the Prosecuting Attorney, the existence of which is 
now known or is available to the Prosecuting Attorney by the exercise of due diligence. 
e. That the said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to have made 
available to him a written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of 
relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at trial, together with any record of a 
prior felony conviction of any such person which is within the knowledge of the Prosecuting 
Attorney. 
f. That if, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this request and to 
Rule l 6(b) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, and prior to or during trial, the state discovers additional 
evidence or the evidence of any additional witness or witnesses and such evidence is or may be 
subject to discovery and inspection under such prior order, the Prosecuting Attorney shall 
promptly notify the defendant, his attorney, and the court of the existence of additional evidence 
and/or the names of such additional witnesses or to allow the court to modify the pervious order 
or to allow the defendant to make an appropriate motion for additional discovery or inspection. 
g. That the said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to have made 
available to her all statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution 
witnesses to the Prosecuting Attorney or his agents or to any official involved in the 
investigatory process of this case. 
h. That the said defendant be permitted, in person and through his attorney, to have made 
available to him all reports and memoranda in the Prosecuting Attorney's possession which were 
made by a police officer or investigator in connection with the investigation or prosecution of 
this case. 
DATED this j1.__ day of February, 2017. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J7_ day of February, 2017, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to, or by 
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by 
facsimile: 
Moscow City Prosecutor's Office 
Moscow City Hall 
P.O. Box 9203 
Moscow, ID 83843 




DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 3 
IN THE DISTRIC~OURT OF THE SECOND JUPIC! DISTRICT OF THE . . 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH · 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
) CASE NO · CR-2O17-OO2-30: NO____ __ 
)) PRE-TRIAL MOTION ZfJ i 1 HAR - 7 pf.• ..., ) . 19 ._j! 24 
vs. CLERK OF r;0 ·c, r'\, , _ 
)) lATAY(c6u~h\-Cci_i[(; 
DANIEL C. AMSTAD, 
-------------- ) 8'( DEFENDANT. ) ----OCPUTY 
(THE STATE) (C~W), AND THE DEFENDANT, MOVE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS: . 
T"" 1. SET THIS CASE ON ~-4'\_ :a:::( ~ \}: , AT :~: w-f M. FOR: 
.:£j_p., SE_T OR ~E-TRIAL / COURT ~IAL / SENTENCING /STATUS 
_B. SENTEN~MENDATIONS BELOW** 
_c. COURT TRIAL 
ANY WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL MUST BE DONE BY DEFENDANT ON THE RECORD. 
_D. JURY TRIAL 
_2. DISMISS THIS CASE. REASON IS STATED BELOW** 
_3. AMEND THE CHARGE TO I.C. __________________ _ 
_ 4. RECOMMEND WITHHELD JUDGMENT. TERMS DETAILED BELOW**. 
1-5. ••oTHER -ti \ffi.J. ~ b.. .-\\:, 9J l1 '-x\A:n::YJ )'',() u1/] 
_6. REIMBURSMENT FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER - ... Y _ES ____ ...,.NO-._ __ $._ __ _ 
_ 7. I UNDERSTAND THE CHARGE AGAINST ME AND THE POTENTIAL PENALTIES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF PLEADING GUil TY. I UNDERSTAND MY RIGHTS AS AN ACCUSED 
PERSON AND I VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS. IF I AM NOT REPRESENTED BY AN 
ATTORNEY, THEN I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PLEA. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE. I ALSO WAIVE MY 
RIGHT TO ENTER MY GUil TY PLEA ORALLY ON THE RECORD. x _________ _ 




_GUil TY PLEA ACCEPTED (SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS NOT ACCEPTED BY COURT UNLESS 
CHECKED HERE OR ACCEPTED IN COURT.) 
THE DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUil TY; FINED $ _________ INCLUDING COSTS. 
MOTION HEARING _________ _ 
JURY PRE-TRIAL. __________ _ John C; Judge 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
JURY/COURT TRIA __________ _ 
SENTENCING. ___________ _ 
Revised 12/30/2016 
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PERSON AND I VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS. IF I AM NOT REPRESENTED BY AN 
ATTORNEY, THEN I WAIVE MY RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PLEA. 
I ADMIT THE CHARGE IS TRUE AND I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE. I ALSO WAIVE MY 
RIGHT TO ENTER MY GUil TY PLEA ORALLY ON THE RECORD. 
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MOTION HEARING _________ _ 
John C .. Judge 
JURY PRE-TRIAL __________ _ 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
JURY/COURT TRIAL _________ _ 
SENTENCING ___________ _ 
Revised 12/30/2016 
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Attorney at Law 
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Idaho State Bar No. 9515 
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CASE NO. CR-lw o,89 
,1-·:J..W 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Daniel Amstad, and requests an order dismissing the above 
captioned case. This motion is based upon the grounds that, even if all the facts alleged by the State 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, those facts do not amount to the offense of "frequenting" as 
defined in Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d). 
I. FACTS 
For the purposes of this motion only, Defendant concedes the following facts. 1 On 
January 30, 2017, at about 10:40 p.m., Officer Joe Sieverding approached a stopped H01:1da 
Accord in which Daniel Amstad was a passenger. Based on the smell of marijuana, Sieverding 
knocked on the window, and the driver, CH, turned over mmijuana and a glass bong. Sieverding 
1 Defendant specifically reserves his right to a jury trial and the right to require the State to carry its burden at trial of 
establishing the facts outlined above beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in this motion should be taken as an admission 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
searched the vehicle and found more marijuana and paraphernalia in the trunk. He cited both 
passengers, Amstad and Noah Sharp, for Frequenting, Idaho Code 37-2732(d), a misdemeanor 
defined by being present at a place where a person knows illegal drugs are used, manufactured, 
cultivated, or held. 
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Even if all the facts above are true, Amstad cannot be guilty of "Frequenting" because one 
cannot "frequent" a vehicle. Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any 
place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or 
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, 
use, or to be given away." (emphasis added) 
A vehicle is not a "premises of any place." When in a vehicle, one is not "present at or on 
premises of any place." Therefore, criminal liability does not attach under that statute when one is a 
passenger in a vehicle in which drugs are present. 
Attached is a report from the Boise Community Ombudsman which address this very issue. 
(See pages 7-11.) After an in depth discussion regarding Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d) and the language 
used therein, the report reaches the conclusion that "the 'premises of any place' does not include a 
'mobile domain' such as a motor vehicle or a boat." Id. at 11. Defendant incorporates the analysis 
9f the "frequenting" statute contained in the Ombudsman's report into this motion. 
Although there is no appellate law addressing this issue in Idaho, Twin Falls County 
Magistrate Thomas D. Kershaw, Jr. addressed this specific issue in State v. Traveller, Twin Falls 
County Case No. CR-2008-215, and Judge Stephen Clark addressed this issue in State v. Reid, 
Bonneville County Case No. CR-2014-3601. Attached is a copy of Judge Kershaw's Memorandum 
on the part of Defendant that any of the facts alleged by the State or Officer Sieverding are true. 
MOTlmJ TO DISMISS -2 
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Opinion Concerning Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion to Suppress Evidence, and Judge 
Clark's Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss. Judge Kershaw and Judge Clark reached the same . 
conclusion as the Boise Community Ombudsman. Defendant incorporates Judge Kershaw's and 
Judge Clark's analysis and reasoning into this motion. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The court must grant Amstad's Motion to Dismiss because one cannot "frequent" a vehicle. 
One traveling in a vehicle is not "at or on premises of any place." Therefore, Idaho Code § 37-
2732(d) does not apply to the alleged conduct of Defendant and his case must be dismissed. 
Dated this k_1 day of ~h , 2017 
An~-------
Attomey for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11/Jday of tv\.,~ , 2017, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS on the party listed below, by fax and/or 
mailing with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand-delivered, as indicated 
hereafter. 
PARTIES SERVED: SERVICE TYPE: 
Moscow City Prosecutor's Office ~Couiihouse Box 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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CASE NO. CR 2008-215 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
CONCERNING MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
This matter came before the court for trial on April 14, 2008. The defendant, Riley 
Traveller, had been accused by a uniform citation of "frequenting a place where drugs are being 
stored" in violation of Idaho Code §37-2732(d). 
The defendant pied not guilty and requested a trial. Through counsel he filed a Motion 
To Suppress Evidence. It was agreed that the matter could be tried to the .court and that the 
court would consider the suppression motion based upon the evidence produced at trial. 
At the close of the state's evidence the defendant made a Motion For Judgment Of 
Acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, Idaho Criminal Rules, and also renewed his motion to suppress 
evidence. 
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On January 4, 2008 at about 10:00 p.m., Twin Falls Police Officer Justin Hendrickson 
was stationed in an alley watching a nearby house. The nature of his activities was described 
as a "drug interdiction." Also involved in the operation was Detective Steele. 
Officer Hendrickson saw a vehicle pull into the parking lot of a nearby business at a high 
rate of speed. The business was closed. The lights on the vehicle were then turned off. 
Detective Steele approached the vehicle to check on a report concerning fireworks. He asked 
for assistance and Officer Hendrickson pulled his patrol vehicle across the street and walked 
over to the parked car. He looked into the now unoccupied vehicle and saw in plain view an · 
opened can of beer and a plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance which he believed 
to be marijuana. He smelled the odor of green marijuana in the general area. He walked 
behind a nearby bar looking for the people who had left the vehicle. In a narrow space between 
the bar and an adjacent building he saw two people "hunkered down". He believed they were 
from the car. He had so much equipment on that he could not follow them into the narrow 
space, but he called to them and they both came. One of these people was the defendant. The 
other was an individual named Greenwood. 
There was a conversation about the fireworks. Greenwood admitted that he was driving 
the vehicle. Greenwood admitted that he had marijuana in the car. He was arrested for 
possession of marijuana and for possession of alcohol by a minor. 
After the arrest of Greenwood, the officer had a conversation with Mr. Traveller. It was 
raining hard and the defendant stood under an awning to keep dry. He was not under arrest but 
both officers were nearby. Officer Hendrickson testified that the defendant was not constantly 
watched, but that if he had tried to leave, the officer would have stopped him. The defendant 
was asked if he knew his friend had possession of alcohol and marijuana. The defendant 
reportedly said that he did know. He was then placed under arrest. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION CONCERNING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 






The defendant's motion to suppress is based primarily upon the failure of the police 
officer to inform him of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him about his knowledge of the 
drugs. 
The defendant's Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal raises two arguments. First, no proof was 
presented that the material in the Greenwood car was marijuana. Second, the statute in 
question does not create criminal liability for "frequenting" a motor vehicle, even if there are 
drugs known to be in the vehicle. 
111. 
DISCUSSION 
The court will consider the latter issue first. I.C. §37-2732(d) says: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place 
where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or 
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, 
use or to be given away. 
The defendant argues that the term "premises" in the statute refers to a fixed location, 
and therefore criminal liability under this statute cannot arise out of proximity to a movable motor 
vehicle. The state argues that the statute also refers to items being held for "transportation" and 
therefore being present at a vehicle being used to transport illegal drugs is "frequenting". 
The court has consulted several dictionaries and agrees with the defendant that the term 
"premises" means lands and the buildings thereon. (See for example: Black's Law Dictionary, 
Revised Fourth Edition, p. 1344). However, in reviewing the statute, the court finds that the 
more significant term to be defined is "place". The unlawful act is "to be present at or on 
premises of any place ... ". Thus, if a person were present at a place, but not on the premises 
of such place, he could still be in violation of this statute. Black's Law Dictionary says that the 
word "place" is "a very indefinite term." The dictionary goes on to say that this word "is applied 
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to any locality, limited by boundaries, however large or however small . . . In its primary and 
most general sense [it] means locality, situation, or site, and it is also used to designate an 
occupied situation or building." (Revised Fourth Edition, p. 1307.) 
A popular non-legal dictionary gives fourteen definitions for "place". Some of these are 
irrelevant to the current analysis, but in all relevant respects, the definitions relate to a particular 
location, region, building or point in space (See: Webster's New World Dictionary, Pocket Size 
Edition, i 975). 
The court notes that the terminology in the statute supports the argument that the 
legislature intended a particular geographical location when using these terms. It is said to be 
unlawful "for any person to be present at or on premises of any place ... ". If the legislature had 
meant to include movable motor vehicles, presumably the words "in" or "near" would have been 
used. One is at a house or on land. One is in or near a car. 
Regarding the state's argument about the term "transportation," the statute says that one 
has to be "present at or on premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances 
are being ... held for ... transportation ... ". It is therefore not the transportation which is 
illegal but the act of being present at a place where drugs are being held for transportation. 
As the defendant points out, the statute is at the very least ambiguous as. applied to 
people who are in proximity to illegal drugs in motor vehicles. Ambiguous criminal statues must 
be strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Martinez, i 26 Idaho 801, 891 P.2d 1061 
(App. 1995). 
For this reason, the court finds the statute inapplicable to this defendant's actions as 
described in the evidence, and therefore grants his motion for acquittal. The court finds that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for "frequenting". The court notes as an 
additional basis for this decision that other than the officer's visual inspection, no evidence was 
presented at the trial that the substance found in the Greenwood vehicle was an "illegal 
controlled substance". 
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It is unnecessary to rule_ on the Motion To Suppress Evidence. 
It is therefore ORDERED that this case is dismissed. 
DATED this ..2_ day of May, 2008. 
s_(}v_\AG,~ 
Thomas D. Kershaw, Jr. 
Magistrate Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the B day of May, 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Fritz Wonderlich 
City Attorney 
PO Box 1812 
Twin Falls ID 83301 
Anthony Valdez 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 366 
Twin Falls ID 83301 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
,J--YCourt Folder 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand delivered 
( ) Faxed 
, ~)'Court Folder 
~ l UiaJ5Q/h:J 
C 
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Case No. CR- 2014-3601 
COURT'S ORDER 
ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter came on for hearing on July 23, 2014 on the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The 
State was represented by Mr. Crowiher and the Defense by Mr. Crane. The motion was 
predicated on the inapplicability of the term "premises" to a vehicle. Mr. Crane provided a 
rather extensive review of the statute from an ombudsman's report from 2006. He also appended 
to his motion an unpublished opinion from Twin Falls in support of his position. In that opinion 
the magistrate focused his attention on the term "place". Mr. Crowther argues that the definition 
of"premises" as argued by Mr. Crane was much too narrow. Not surprisingly, Mr. Crane argued 
that Mr. Crowther's response was much too broad as there would be virtually no limit as to what 
would constitute a "premises''. 
The Defendant conceded the facts as adopted by the state as being true for the purpose of his 
motion. That is, the defense conceded: that jurisdiction was proper; identification was not 
disputed; that there were controlled substances in the vehicle and that 
were control1ed substances in the vehicle in which she was traveling. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss-Page 1 






As the defense has agreed that the facts are to be construed in favor of the state the Court will 
proceed accordingly. The Court views the issue as being made up of three parts. The parties 
focused their arguments on whether a vehicle constituted a "premises." The Court has reviewed 
the documents provided by the defendant and considered the arguments of counsel. Neither the 
ombudsman's report nor the Twin Falls case submitted in this matter by Mr. Crane is binding 
upon the Court. However, the court appreciates the reasoning employed by both sources. The 
discussion focusses around the statutory language, to-wit: "It shall be unlawful for any person to 
be present at or on the premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are 
being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, 
administration, use, or be given away. " (Emphasis added) 
The legislative history indicates that the legislature has tried to cast as broad a net as possible in 
adopting this statute. Idaho Session Laws 1972, ch. 133, Section 6 p. 261 struck the language 
from the original statute which required a person to "knowingly frequent" such places to require 
that "he knows." The more expansive amendment followed in 1977 with Senate Bill 1109 
substituting "be present at or on the premises" for "frequenting". The net effect was to eliminate 
the requirement of repeated conduct and to expose an individual to criminal charges for a single 
act The general reference to this charge as "frequenting" is actually a misnomer, because with 
the changes a single action v>1ould now constitute a violation. The current iteration now suffers 
from the amendments as the attempt to broaden the·statute without completely rewriting it or 
integrating the changes provides the opportunity to make the arguments presented in this case. 
The term "premises" is used repeatedly through the Idaho Code. In most situations, when it is 
used in the statutes it is used conventionally. That is, the term generally references a specific 
location and usually land. Several statues attempt to define, "premises". Idaho code Sections; 
Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss-Page 2 
000033 
-
23-902, 48-703, and 48-602 all have definitions of "premises." In each case the definition seems 
to use the term as defining a set point rather than a mobile method of transportation. Where it is 
defined, it is never used to describe a car. At least one case did talk about the term in the context 
, of construing a contract, Haines v. Continental Insurance. Co. 852 F. 2d 1289 (1988.) In that 
case the court interpreted the term "premises'' as having to do with land. It would take a 
tortured reading of "premises" to expand it to include a car. A mobile home or trailer may be an 
exception to this definition. 
That does not end the discussion as the Court in Twin Falls focused on the term "place" rather 
than "premises". This constitutes the second issue involving this statute. The language references 
at or on the premises of any place. It is informative to note that it does not say premises or any 
place, but rather the premises of any place. If the disjunctive was used then the, court could find 
that although mobile, a car is a place. Given the language used the term "place" appears to be 
modified by the word ''premises." The court is not free to insert terms into statutes when there 
is no ambiguity, Roe v. Hopper, 90 Idaho 22, 408 P .2d 1161 (1965) (Court construing the term 
"place,") There is one statutory definition of "place". Idaho code section 23-942 does define the 
term "place" where the sale of alcoholic beverages occurs. In that context it talks about any 
room of any premises. Once again we circle back around to a fixed physical location. "Place" is 
discussed in Sun Valley v. Sinclair, 123 Idaho 665, 851 P.2d 961 (1993) in regard to taxing 
issues. However, the decision does not assist the court in interpreting the statute at issue. 
Intermountain Health Care v. Blaine County, 109 Idaho 412, 707 P.2d 1051 (1985) discusses 
"place of domicile" for indigency purposes, but it again adds little. Lastly, Voyles v. City of 
Nampa, 97 Idaho 597, 548 P. 2d 1217 (1976) talks about a "public place", but again provides no 
benefit in solving this conundrum. 
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The third and final issue deals with what knowledge is necessary. To date the general 
understanding was that if the defendant had knowledge that a controlled substance was present; 
that was sufficient. Under most circumstances the burden is too easily met. (ln thinking back 
over my years at Berkeley, its 30,000 plus student population would have provided substantial 
fodder for this statue if simple knowledge that someone possessed marijuana created criminal 
liability for frequenting.) However, the statute requires more than knowledge that controlled 
substances are present, "where he knows". The statute further requires knowledge that the 
controlled substances are present for: manufacture, cultivation, use, distribution, transportation, 
or being freely given away. To construe the statute to require only knowledge that the substance 
was present would virtually criminalize knowledge and open the door to a panoply of concerns. 
ls walking past a house where you know a controlled substance might be present sufficient to 
bring the statute into play? It would further potentially punish people who perhaps never had any 
intention to use or even touch the controlled substance. Circumstantially, once an individual is 
in a car, it would be hard to argue 1?-at the controlled substance was not being transported. There 
have been no challenges to the statute itself as being overly broad in either its application or in 
general. 
CONCLUSION 
Both documents provided by the defense recognize that the concept of lenity requires the court 
to strictly construe criminal statutes against the state, State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 891 P. 2d 
1061, (Ct of App 1995). There is no question that this is a crin1inal statute. As the court was 
considering this issue, it was put in mind of President Clinton's defense of, "it depends on what 
the definition of "is" is. Only in this profession would someone spend 4 pages dealing with the 
etymology and arcane definition of "premises" and "place". Be that as it may, the Court 
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concludes that a vehicle is neither a "premises" nor a "premises of any place". As a result the 
defendant cannot be "at" or "on" a "premises" or "premises of any place". Whether the 
defendant had knowledge that the controlled substances were being used, distributed, 
transported, or etc. is a jury question and would not provide a basis for dismissal. 
Based upon the above the motion to suppress is GRANTED. The Court would encourage either 
party offended by this opinion to appeal the matter so that those more ,vise and learned can 
address the issue. 
DATED this ¼17.ay of July~ 2014. 
~ . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'¼:J 
l hereby certify that on this_!_. _ day of July, 2014, a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was personally delivered, by hand delivery or to the Courthouse Box, sent by facsimile or mailed by first 
class mail with prepaid postage as indicated below: 
Tanner F. Crowther 
Prosecutors Officer 
,,-::· 
~ Courthouse Box 
John M. Ohman 
Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter 
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Complaint Investigation & Findings 
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The Complainants in this case are Witness #1 's parents. On September 7, 2005, two 
juveniles, Witness #1 and Witness #2, both students at School #1, left campus in Witness 
#2's car to have lunch. Witness #2 parked his car in a private parking lot of a business. 
Witness #3, an employee of the business, went to investigate and saw a bag of marijuana 
sitting on the seat. She contacted Officer # 1 to report the possible controlled substance 
violation. While she and another employee waited for the police to arrive, they moved a 
different car in back of Witness #2's car to block it from exiting the parking space. 
Officer #2 and Officer #3 were the first to arrive on the scene, followed by Officer #4. After 
brief questioning, Witness #2 admitted that the marijuana belonged to him and gave it to the 
officers. Officer # I arrived a short time later and charged Witness #2 with the possession of 
marijuana. He also charged Witness # I with the misdemeanor commonly referred to as 
"frequenting" for having knowingly been in the company of someone who was in possession 
of a controlled substance. After the boys left the scene, Officer # 1, who still had his audio 
recorder on, questioned whether the frequenting charges applied, laughed, and described 
Witness #1 as a "lying little asshole." At the request of the State, a magistrate later 
dismissed the misdemeanor frequenting charge against Witness #1. 
THE COMPLAINT 
The Complainants are the parents of Witness #1. On September 7, 2005, Witness #1 and 
Witness #2 parked, without permission, in a private parking lot of a downtown business. 
-
OHf06J00n 
o..,J,~·,., R-<f<'* - c,, .... ~ r,,....,,4+:w,,. ,,.,w;1, F~ 
~30, 2006 
-
Witness #3, an employee of the business, saw a baggie of marijuana on the seat of the car. 
She contacted the police; and four Boise Police officers detained Witness #1 and Witness #2. 
Witness #2 admitted that the marijuana belonged to him. Officer #1 charged Witness #2 
with the possession of marijuana, and accused Witness #1 of having smoked marijuana with 
his friend. The Complainants state that Officer #1 spoke to Witness #1 in a belittling and 
unprofessional manner. They also state that Officer # 1 filed a questionable "frequenting" 
charge against Witness #1. They feel that the charges were filed against Witness #1 in 
retaliation against him for having been, in the officer's words, a "little lying asshole" when 
he denied that he had used drugs. The Complainants filed a complaint with this office by 
hand-delivering a letter on February 28, 2006. The Complainants' allegations, if proven true, 
would be violations of the Boise Police Department's Policy § 11.03.02 Perfonnance of 
Duty, § 11.01.07 Relationships with Others and Demeanor, and § 11.03.04 General 
Discharge of Duties. 
THE COMPLAINT INVEST/GA TION 
The investigation into this complaint included a review of the dispatch records. It also 
included a review of the documents provided by the Complainants, including a transcript of 
Officer #1 's audio recordings, Officer #1 's report, the Petition charging Witness #1 with 
Frequenting, the Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum filed by the attorney for 
Witness # 1, the Motion to Dismiss field by the State, the Order to Dismiss signed by the 
court, a hand-drawn diagram by Officer #4, and an unsigned, undated letter from Witness #3. 
Four digital audio recordings made by officers during the incident were reviewed and 
analyzed for relevant evidence. Interviews of Officer #1, Officer #2, Officer #4, and Witness 
#1 were also conducted; and a conversation was held with an attorney in the prosecutorial 
agency that prosecuted, and ultimately dismissed, the frequenting charge. 
OHE06/002~ 
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WHAT THE COMPLAINT TNVEST1GATION FOUND 
-
Based on the preponderance of the evidence obtained and reviewed in the course of this 
investigation, I issued the following findings of fact. 
1. Witness #1 and Witness #2 left School #1 to have lunch. 
2. Witness #2 parked his car in the private parking lot of a business near the 
restaurant where Witness #1 and Witness #2 went to eat. 
3. Witness #3 noted that the car did not belong in her employer's parking lot and 
went to investigate. 
4. Witness #3 found a baggie of marijuana in plain view on the front seat of Witness 
#2 's car and contacted the police. 
5. Witness #3 and a co-worker blocked Witness #2's car from leaving the parking 
space. 
6. While Witness #3 was waiting for the police to aITive, Witness# 1 and Witness #2 
returned from having lunch. 
7. With Witness #3 still blocking the parking place in order to prevent Witness # 1 
and Witness #2 from leaving, Witness #1 opened the car door and removed the 
baggie of marijuana from the front seat, then walked toward a nearby dumpster 
and threw something in, which later turned out to be paper plates and pizza crusts. 
8. Officer #2, Officer #3, and Officer #4 arrived at the scene and began conducting 
preliminary questioning of Witness# l and Witness #2. 
9. Witness #2 admitted he had marijuana and turned it over to Officer #2. 
10. Witness #1 did not know that Witness #2 had marijuana in the car until they were 
already en route to the restaurant. 
11. Officer # l administered field sobriety tests to Witness # 1 and concluded that 
Witness #1 was not under the influence of marijuana; however Officer #1 decided 
to charge Witness #1 with the misdemeanor frequenting a place where drugs were 
being held for use. 
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13. After Witness # 1 and Witness #2 had left, Officer # 1 began discussing the matter 
with one of the other officers. 
14. During the conversation, Officer # 1 said that he thought the frequenting charges 
applied to Witness #1 and referred to Witness #1 as "a little lying asshole." 
15. Officer #1 realized that his audio recorder was still on, laughed, and said that 
what he meant to say was that if Witness # l was not being honest, he "should 
probably ... " The tape then ends. 
16. The State filed a Petition on December 19, 2005, charging Witness #1 with 
Frequenting, a misdemeanor, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d). 
17. Witness #1 filed a Motion to Dismiss, accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum, on February 2, 2006. 
18. The State also filed a Motion to Dismiss sometime in February 2006. 
19. The State's Motion to Dismiss was based on the fact that Witness #1 claimed, and 
the State could not disprove, that he had no knowledge that the marijuana was 
present in the car at the time he got into the car. 
20. The presiding magistrate granted one of the pa11ies' motions and entered an Order 
to Dismiss. 
OMBUDSMAN'S ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
I. Performance of Duty. 
A. The Frequenting Statute. 
The Complainants' first claim is that Officer# 1 pursued a questionable charge of frequenting 
against Witness #1. The Boise Police Department's policy(§ 11.03.02) Performance of Duty 
states, in relevant paii: 
P~I./ 000041 
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An employee shall perform his/her duties in a manner which will maintain the 
highest standards of efficiency in carrying out the Department's.functions and 
objectives. Satisfactory pe1formance and competence is demonstrated by: 
• Adequate knowledge of the application o,f laws required to be enforced 
In this case, Officer #1 charged Witness #1 with the misdemeanor of frequenting as 
defined in Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d): 
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any place 
where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or 
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transpo1iation, delivery, 
administration, use, or to be given away. A violation of this section shall 
deem those persons guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars ($300) and not more 
than ninety (90) days in the county jail, or both. 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(d). The Complainants raise the question whether a charge of 
frequenting can be made against someone who is merely in the presence of a second person 
who is unlawfully in the possession of a controlled substance. In interviewing the officers 
involved, it became clear that there are key provisions of the statute that appear to be 
construed differently within the police department itself. Additional research indicates that 
law enforcement's interpretation of the statue may be inconsistent with the plain meaning of 
the statue. 
B. The Statutory History. 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732 was originally enacted in 1971. IDAHO SESSION LAWS 1971, ch. 215, 
§ 1 p. 939. The original statute included only subsections (a) through (c); it did not include 
subsection (d). The statute was amended in 1972 to add subsection (d); the original language 
of this subsection was: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly frequent places where illegal 
controlled substances are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, 
administration, use, or to be given away. A violation of this subsection shall deem 
those persons guilty of a petty misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished 
by a fine of not more that five hundred dollars ($500) and not more than thi1iy (30) 
days in the county jail, or both. 
-
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IDAHO SESSION LA ws 1972, ch. 133, § 6 p. 261. Subsection ( d) was amended that same year 
to delete the word, "knowingly," and substitute the phrase, "he knows," after the word 
"frequent." IDAHO SESSION LAWS 1972, ch. 409, § 1 p. 1195. 
In 1977, the legislature modified subsection (d) to include the language present in the statute 
today. Senate Bill 1109 was introduced on February 2, 1977, and added subsection (f), 
which addressed a situation in which two or more persons conspired to commit any offense 
under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. As noted in the minutes of the Senate 
Judiciary and Rules Committee, the purpose of the bill was to add the crime of conspiracy to 
sell drugs under the state's adoption of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act: 
RS 1968 Controlled Substances, Consgiracy -· prescribes offenses and penalties for 
conspiracy under the act. Senator Risch stated that this legislation provides for 
additional crime and penalty under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act applicable 
to those who conspire to sell or transport controlled substances. 
Minutes of the Judiciary and Rules Committee, February 2, 1977, p. l. The Statement of 
Purpose for R.S. 1968, which was subsequently designated as Senate Bill 1109, explained: 
This bill is an attempt to immobilize the top echelon financiers of drug 
trafficking by prescribing offenses and penalties for conspiracy under the Uniform 
Controlled Substance Act. 
This bill is submitted at the request of the Idaho Department of Law 
Enforcement. 
Statements of Purpose (1977), R.S. 1698, S.B. 1109. 
While the Senate introduced a bill to create the crime of conspiracy under the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the house introduced a separate bill, R.S. 1821, later 
designated House Bill 152, which amended the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in three 
respects. Its first proposed change, the one that is applicable to the present discussion, was to 
change the word, "frequenting," to the phrase "be present at or on the premises." The 
purpose of the change was to make the charge easier to prove; the minutes of the House 
Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee state: 
Mr. Hosack spoke in support of this bill [R.S. 1821, later designated House Bill 152], 
indicating that it was necessary to clear up some conflicts in the bill among other 
things. It would change the wording from "frequenting" a place where there is 
P~6. 
0- u· ·o f]' · ·1·· · ·:..,,. ; . ' .,-_;" •,:, ;·' "'7 · '· · · ·~F'l..: 10 
-
Ol·f/;06/002~ 
0,,,-t~',,_ R'f,<4 - C~ 1-,..v,~, ;.,../ F~ 
~>0, 2006 
marijuana to "be at or present". (sic). It is very difficult to prove "frequenting" but 
relatively easy to prove "at or present". (sic). 
Minutes of the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee, February 9, 1977, p. 
1. The purpose of the proposed change was to make the 1aw easier to enforce, Proving that 
someone is present a single time at a location is easier to prove than proving that someone is 
repeatedly or habitually present at a location. Lowering the threshold of activity that would 
result in criminal liability was clearly the object of the amendment. The changes House Bill 
152 proposed eventually became the House Amendments to Senate Bill 1109, including the 
deletion of the word, "frequenting," and the insertion of the phrase, "be at or on the premises 
of any place." Senate Bill 1109, as amended by the House, was approved on March 30, 
1977, and subsequently became law. 
C. The Interpretation of the Term, "Premises of any Place." 
The first question is what the term, "premises of any place," means as used in Idaho Code § 
37-2732(d). The officers interpret the statute broadly, focusing on the object of the 
preposition, "any place." Officer# 1, Officer #2, and Officer #3 all stated that a premises can 
be any place, including places open to the public, such as parks, as long as the person 
charged is in the company of a person who is in the possession of drugs, and that person 
knows that his or her companion has drngs. This interpretation implies that it is not only 
illegal to frequent a "place," it is illegal to frequent a "person." 
Under this expansive interpretation, the concept of the "premises of any place" where drugs 
are known to be used or sold becomes peripatetic. Any location, including a street comer, a 
car, a parking lot, a restaurant, a public park, or any other place that a person has a legal right 
to be, has the potential to become an illegal venue, regardless of whether drugs are 
customarily known to be sold or used there or not. The place is a legal place to be, or not, 
depending on who is there. The only factor that determines the legality of a person's 
presence in that location is whether someone else in that location is in the possession of 
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A hypothetical example can help to illustrate the type of problem that can arise. If person 
"A" were attending a concert at a public concert house, and persons sitting near "A" began 
smoking marijuana cigarettes, under the interpretation put forward by the officer, "A" could 
be charged with frequenting. "A" probably paid for a ticket to enter the concert venue and 
would be disinclined to leave the concert simply because people in the vicinity were smoking 
marijuana. "A" may also find the marijuana smoke objectionable and disapprove of the 
activity. Nonetheless, under the interpretation put forth by the officers, "A" has a duty to 
leave the premises or risk being charged with frequenting. Under that interpretation, "A" 
does not have the right to remain in a place open to the public, even if "A" paid for the 
privilege of being there. 
The above interpretation differs somewhat from the interpretation of Officer #5, who 
accompanied Officer # l to the interview. Officer #5 conducts officer training; and he 
addresses the issue of frequenting in his training. Officer #5 has a more limited view of the 
meaning of "premises:" he explained that a person in a public venue, such as a park, would 
not be charged with frequenting. On the other hand, because a vehicle is a part of a person's 
domain, it is appropriate to charge someone with frequenting if the premises where the drugs 
are located is a vehicle. 
In support of this interpretation, Officer #3 explained that many mobile methamphetamine 
labs are located in motor vehicles. The narcotics unit often uses the frequenting statute to 
charge persons who are in the vicinity of a vehicle where methamphetamine is being 
manufactured, even if those persons cannot be clearly tied to the manufacturing operation. 
Even though there is some variance between the officers' interpretation of the statue with 
respect to the question whether Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) applies to a public venue, there is 
no divergence in the interpretation of the statue when it comes to the question whether a 
"place" includes a vehicle. Clearly, according to the officers, a "place," for the purpose of 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d), includes a vehicle. 
- -
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The question whether the term, "premises," includes a person's vehicle was answered 
differently by the attorney who represented Witness #1. In his Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, the attorney argued that, in the applicable statute, Idaho Code § 37-
2732(d), the term, "premises," does not include a vehicle: 
In fact, the terms "premises" and "vehicle" are separate and distinct concepts. This 
point is evident throughout the Idaho Code where both of these terms are used 
frequently, but not interchangeably, Compare I.C. § 23-l00l(g) (d.efining "premises" 
to include "the building and contiguous property" but not a motor vehicle.); and I.C. 
§ 49-l 23(g) ( defining "motor vehicle" to include "self-propelled" vehicles, but 
making no mention of premises, buildings or the like). 
Had the legislature intended the statute to apply to motor vehicles, it would have said 
so. A search of the Idaho statutes utilizing the Westlaw database by the undersigned 
located 53 statutes where the Idaho legislature used the word ''automobile," 970 
statutes using "motor vehicle" and 1170 statutes which referred to "vehicle." Among 
these statutes is [Idaho Code § 37-2737A(2)] where the legislature expanded the 
common definition of "premises," in that statute only, to include motor vehicles: 
As used in this section, premises means any: 
(a) motor vehicle or vessel; 
(b) dwelling or rental unit including, but not limited to, apartment, townhouse, 
condominium, mobile home, manufactured home, motel room or hotel room; 
( c) Dwelling house, its curtilage and any other outbuildings. 
I.C. § 37-2737A(2) (emphasis added). [statute governing the manufacture or delivery 
of controlled substances where children are present]. 
Of course, no such expansive definition of premises is contained in the frequenting 
statute, Idaho Code § 37-2732(d), and no mention is made of the statue being 
applicable to motor vehicles. As the legislature has not specifically defined 
"premises" or "premises of any place" to include a motor vehicle, the ordinary 
definition applies which would exclude motor vehicles. To the extent this Court 
concludes that this statute is ambiguous, it must apply the doctrine of lenity and 
construe the statute in the favor of the accused. [State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 156, 
75 P.3d 206,210 (Ct. App. 203)]. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 7-8. The legislature was able to define 
"premises" to include a motor vehicle when it wished to prohibit that manufacture or 
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2737A(2). Idaho Code§ 37-2737A(2) is in the same title and chapter as Idaho Code§ 37-
2732( d); yet the broader definition of "premises" is limited only to the application of Idaho 
Code§ 37-2737A. 
In analyzing this section, it is important to begin with the plain language of the statute. 
Generally, the words of a statute must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and 
the statute must be construed as a whole. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 
P.3d 850 (2001). The statute states that it is "unlawful to be at or on the premises of any 
place" where illegal controlled substances are used, manufactured, or distributed. The 
prepositional phrase, ''of any place" modifies the noun, "premises." Premises and place are 
not used in the disjunctive: the statute does not prohibit a person's presence at a premises or 
a place; it prohibits a person's presence on a premises. 
Turning first to the meaning of the word, "place," it is noted that when used as a noun, the 
word, "place" has many meanings, including, for example, the indication of a particular 
passage or page in a book, such as to mark one's place; or the word "place" can mean the 
concept of position or standing, especially one of impo1iance, such as to indicate a person's 
place in history. In the context of Idaho Code § 37-2732(d), the following definitions of 
"place" are applicable: "7. a residence; dwelling; house and grounds 8. a building or space 
devoted to a special purpose (a place of amusement). WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 
OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (2nd college edition 1970), p. 1086-87. Looking at the plain 
language of the statute, the prepositional phrase, "of any place," means that premises is not 
limited to a house, but includes any residence, any building, and any space devoted to a 
special purpose, such as a business or an office. The phrase, "of any place," clarifies that the 
scope of the statute is not limited to a house or a residence, but includes a wide variety of 
fixed locations. 
The statute prohibits a person's presence at or on the "premises of any place." The word 
"premises" is the focal point of the statutory prohibition. The Oxford English Dictionary 
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outbuildings, occupied by a business or considered in an official context." The Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary defines "premises" as: "3 plural [from its being identified in the 
premises of the deed] a : a tract of land with the buildings thereon b : a building or part of a 
building usually with its appurtenances (as grounds)." Here again, the words used include 
the concept of a fixed location on a specific piece of ground. The plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning of the word "premises" includes a permanent, fixed, stationary piece of land, and 
the buildings on that land. Looking at the plain meaning of the phrase, "premises of any 
place," it means the buildings, outbuildings, and grounds of any fixed location, whether that 
location is a house, an apartment, a building, a business, a place of commerce, an office, or 
any other definite, permanent, established location. The "premises of any place" does not 
include a "mobile domain" such as a motor vehicle or a boat. 
D. Knowledge of the Presence of Drugs. 
All four of the officers in this case indicated that knowledge of drugs being present is a 
critical element of a charge for frequenting. This is substantiated by Idaho case law on the 
issue. In State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 688 P.2d 1203 ((1984), the defendant argued that 
even if a search wanant for his home was valid, the search of his person was not. He asked 
the trial court to suppress evidence that drugs were found on his person. The trial court 
denied the motion to suppress; and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of 
Appeals noted that the law enforcement officers actually made two arrests, the first of which, 
an a1Test for frequenting, was illegal. The officers made the first anest when Crabb opened 
the door to the mobile home. The Court of Appeals stated: 
As explained more fully below, there were actually two arrests. The first 
occurred before the police entered the mobile home. At that time, Crabb was 
told he was being arrested for "frequenting," in reference to LC. § 37-2732(d). 
This statute makes it a misdemeanor for a person to "frequent places where he 
knows illegal controlled substances are being held for distribution, 
transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away," 
"A peace officer may ... without a wa1nnt, anest a person: 1) For a public 
offense committed in his presence." Idaho Code § 19-603. Therefore, the 
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of the arresting officer. We cannot conclude that he did. The statute requires 
that a person "frequent a place where he knows illegal substances are being 
held for distribution," etc. (Emphasis added). The statute precludes the 
interpretation that a person violates the statute simply by his presence at a 
place where controlled substances are sold. 
Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 303. (Emphasis added). As discussed at length above, the 
legislature revised Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) to eliminate the requirement that the person be 
"frequenting" a place. While the revised statute makes a person's mere presence on a 
premises a criminal act, the requirement of knowledge remains the same. Presence must be 
coupled with knowledge. In Crabb, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the officers did not 
have reason to suspect that Crabb knew, at the time of the first arrest, that illegal substances 
were being held at that premises. The holding in Crabb underscores the fact that actual 
knowledge of the presence of illegal drugs is an element of the crime. 
Knowledge of the presence of illegal drugs can become a critical issue. In this case, the . 
question of when Witness #1 had knowledge that drugs were present becomes problematic. 
Witness #1 stated that he knew Witness #2 had marijuana at his home; however he did not 
know that Witness #2 had marijuana in his car until the car was moving and they were en 
route to lunch. The impo1tance of knowledge of the presence of drugs is further illustrated 
by the prosecutorial agency's decision to dismiss the case. Witness #1 claimed, and the State 
could not disprove, that Witness #1 did not know that drugs were present when he entered 
the vehicle. Moreover, Witness #1 did not re-enter the vehicle after the marijuana was 
discovered. 
At one point, Witness # 1 asked one of the officers whether the law required him to jump out 
of the car as soon as he knew his friend had drugs. This question illustrates the problem of 
considering a vehicle, particularly a moving vehicle, to be "a premises of any place." 
Assuming that the officers' interpretation is correct, and that Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) places 
a duty on a person to leave the company of anyone known to be in the possession of drugs, it 
must be conceded that leaving a moving vehicle can be difficult. 
P~12 
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Even if the car has stopped moving, it is questionable whether the law should require that a 
juvenile become abandoned somewhere without transportation because the person with 
whom the juvenile was riding turns out to be in the possession of drugs. Even assuming that 
a vehicle is a "premises," where there is no indication that Witness. #1 entered the car with 
knowledge of the presence of drugs, a legitimate question arises as to whether his subsequent 
presence in the car is sufficient to trigger criminal liability under Idaho Code § 37-2732(d). 
The prosecutorial agency apparently determined that it did not. 
D. Conclusion. 
Officer #1 's interpretation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) is similar to other members of the 
department in ten11S of the statute's application to vehicles. The preponderance of the 
I 
evidence indicates that it has been the long-time practice of the officers in the Boise Police 
Depa1iment to interpret Idaho Code § 37-2732(d) to include vehicles. In addition, some 
officers read the word, "premises," even more broadly to include, not only a vehicle, but any 
location, public or private. Looking at the statute through the lens of police department use 
and practice, Officer #1 's interpretation of the statute appears to be a well-accepted 
depa1imental interpretation that is consistent with the training provided by other members of 
the department. 
Officer #1 applied the statute in a manner consistent with department training and practice. 
His application of the law appears to be a department-wide interpretation; it was not a 
questionable interpretation by a single officer. The plain reading of the term, "the premises 
of any place," is that it applies to a fixed location only. The term "premises" does not 
include a motor vehicle that is being used as a means of transportation. Officer #1 applied 
the law in the manner consistent with department training and consistent with the 
department's understanding of the statute. Because this is a training issue, I conclude that 
there is no policy violation and that Officer # I should be exonerated. 
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II. Performance of Duty and Impartial and Objective Discharge of 
Duties. 
A. Use of Profanity. 
The last two issues in this case revolve around Officer #1 's statement referring to Witness #1 
as a "lying little asshole." The statement was made to one of the other officers at the scene 
after Witness #1 and Witness #2 had left the scene. Officer #1 's actions following his 
discovery that his audiotape was still running indicate that he was aware that the statement 
was objectionable. He laughed and then stated loudly into the audio recorder, "What I meant 
to say was ifhe was not being honest T should probably [recording ends]." 
The Boise Police Depa1iment's policy(§ 11.01.07) Relationships with Others and Demeanor 
states: 
An employee shall treat all other persons in a civil and respectful manner. 
He/she shall not use profanity or un.complimenta,y speech in the presence of 
members of the public, prisoners, or other persons he/she has contact with 
nor shall he/she intentional~y antagonize any person. 
This policy applies to police conduct with respect to "members of the public, prisoners, or 
other persons [the officer] has contact with." (Emphasis added). Though the thrust of this 
policy section is to prohibit the use of profanity when an officer is engaged with civilians, as 
written, this policy section could be seen as extending the prohibition to include contact with 
colleagues as well as with members of the public. However, this policy section has not been 
interpreted to have this meaning; nor has it been applied in such a manner. 
The present case illustrates the potential negative consequences when a professional law 
enforcement officer uses vulgar, derogatory language with reference to a member of the 
public even when the comment is made outside the presence of the public. Though the 
comment was made to a colleague who apparently did not find the language objectionable, it 
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but also his parents, Witness #1 's defense lawyer, and the prosecutor. According to Officer 
#1, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the case because the comment had been recorded. 
While the Prosecutor's Office explained that the case was dismissed because the State could 
not disprove Witness #l's story, it would be unfo11unate to have an officer's use of profanity 
detract in any way from the prosecution of a criminal charge. 
Boise Police Department Policy prohibits the use of profanity. Though the policy is directed 
toward maintaining professional relations between officers and the public, the fact that the 
policy is not interpreted to include interactions with colleagues does not mean that the use of 
offensive language is acceptable anytime the public is out of earshot. The policy should not 
be seen as unintentionally encouraging officers to use language that might be vulgar or 
distasteful. The use of unprofessional language can have consequences even where it is not 
spoken directly to the public. In this case, the prosecutorial agency chose to dismiss the case 
on the basis of its inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Witness #I had 
knowledge that drugs were present; but Officer #1 's understanding off the situation was that 
his recorded comment may have contributed to the decision. ft would be unfortunate if a 
police officer's choice of language detracted from the prosecution of a criminal case. 
Officer# 1 used profanity, but did not do so in the presence of a member of the public. For 
the reasons set forth above, I conclude find that Officer #1 did not violate Boise Police 
Department's policy (§ 11.01.07) Relationships with Others and Demeanor and that the 
charge is unfounded. 
B. Lack of Objectivity and Impartiality. 
The Complainants allege that Officer #1 's use of derogatory and objectionable language to 
describe a juvenile also call into question his objectivity and impartiality. For this reason, his 
statement must be evaluated under the Boise Police Department's policy (§ 11 .03 .04) 
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An employee shall pe,form his/her duties in an objective, impartial, and firm 
manner. He/she shall act with other employees to assist and protect each 
other in the maintenance of law and order. 
According to the Complainants, Officer #1 's use of a derogatory term, combined with a 
statement that Witness #1 was lying, raise a concern that Officer #1 filed a questionable 
charge against Witness# I in retaliation for Witness # 1 's perceived behavior. 
Officer #1 stated in his interview that he had known Witness #1 at school, and believed that 
he knew him by name. Witness # 1 confinned that he had had prior contact with Officer # 1 
in the context of school activities. Officer #1 had not called Witness #1 into his office for 
law enforcement reasons. These facts indicate that there was no pre-existing lack of 
objectivity. 
Officer #1 performed field sobriety tests on Witness #1. These tests did not yield facts 
indicating that Witness #1 was under the influence; however, Officer #1 noted that Witness 
#1 had "a hell of a eye-f1utter." For this reason, Officer #1 believed that Witness #1 was not 
being truthful about either having smoked marijuana or having been present when Witness 
#2 was smoking marijuana. Though Officer #1 made an unfortunate word choice in 
expressing his doubts regarding Witness #1 's truthfulness, his concerns regarding Witness 
#1 's honesty were genuine and based on results he obtained as a result of legitimately 
performed field tests. 
In addition, as was discussed above, the charge of frequenting appears to have been made 
within the parameters of accepted departmental practice. Officer #1 's law enforcement 
decisions were not arbitrary or capricious. His judgments, however poorly worded, were 
based on the facts that he gathered throughout the course of the incident. His decision to 
charge Witness #1 with frequenting was based on an interpretation of the law that is accepted 
by other officers in the department. For these reasons, even though the officers' reading of 
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the statute, and even though Officer #1 chose to express his opinion about Witness #1 's 
veracity in less than professional terms, the underlying opinion and the decision to file a 
criminal charge do not evidence a lack of impartiality or objectivity. 
POLICY FINDINGS 
Officer #1: 
P.M. § 11.03.02 - Performance of Duty- Based on a preponderance of the evidence, a 
finding of exonerated is recommended. 
P.M. § 11.01.07 - Relationships with Others and Demeanor - Based on the preponderance of 
the evidence, a finding of unfounded is recommended. 
P.M. § 11.03.04- General Discharge of Duties - Based on a preponderance of the evidence, 
a finding of exonerated is recommended. 
000054 
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POLICY AND TRAINING REVIEW 
It is recommended that the department obtain a legal review of the interpretation ofldaho 
Code§ 37-2732(d) and that the statute be applied in a manner consistent with that review. It 
is noted that there are some variations in interpretation of the statute from one officer to 
another. For this reason, it is also recommended that officer training address the issue in 
order to effect a consistent, department-wide application of the statute. 
Pierce Murphy 
Community Ombudsman 
P.O. Box 500 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 












Case No. CR-2017-0230 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and submits the following Supplemental Response to the 
Request for Discovery: 
Additional reports relevant to the issues in the above-referenced matter and 
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Witnesses subpoenaed by the State are: 
1. Officer Joe Sieverding, MPD 
2. Christopher A. Hughes 
3. Noah A. Sharp 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, if the Prosecutor discovers 
additional evidence or the evidence of an additional witness or witnesses, or decides to use 
additional evidence, witness or witnesses, such evidence shall automatically be subject to 
discovery and inspection. 
r;..~ 
DATED this _o_·_ \ day of 
Erin E. Tomlin 
Prosecuting Attorney 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY: PAGE - 2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the Plaintiff's Supplemental Discovery 
Response were served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Andrea Hunter 
Attorney for Defendant 
Courthouse Mail 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this _'.aj day of ~ ,2o_ll-. 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[]~ 
H'Hand Delivery 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY: PAGE - 3 -
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Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Phone: (208) 883-7005 
Facsimile: (208) 883-7018 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 















The State of Idaho, by and through Erin Tomlin, City of Moscow Prosecuting 
Attorney, and Legal Intern, Scott T. Ugelstad, submits its response to the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
FACTS 
On January 30, 2017, at approximately 10:40 pm, Officer Joe Sieverding noticed a 
Honda Accord with fogged windows parked in the west Wallace Complex parking lot. 
This lot, located across the street from the Wallace Complex dorms, has beeri the location 
of a number of drug related incidents involving Officer Sieverding alone. Sieve:i;-ding 
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approached the car on foot and, as he got closer, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana 
coming from the Honda. The vehicle was not running and, seeing three males inside, he 
walked up and knocked on the passenger window. As Daniel Amstad, the Defendant, 
opened the passenger door, Sieverding could see the driver, CH, hide a plastic baggie 
under his seat. CH also had what appeared to be marijuana residue spilled on his lap. 
Sieverding, who noticed the baggie, asked CH where the marijuana was and CH handed 
him a small sandwich bag from under the seat containing about 16.Sg of marijuana. 
Sieverding then asked what they used to smoke the marijuana with and CH handed him 
a large glass bong from the back seat. 
Sieverding then asked the occupants to step outside of the vehicle while he 
conducted a search. The search resulted in the discovery of one gallon sized Ziploc bag 
with approximately 46.Sg of marijuana in the trunk and other various paraphernalia 
throughout the vehicle. Before the seru;ch ended, CH also pulled an AMS digital scale 
from his pocket and handed it to a covering officer. Sieverding asked CH if he was selling 
marijuana. CH said no but he lets people use his Honda to smoke marijuana. The 
passenger from the back seat, Noah Sharp, said that they walked from the dorms to 
smoke marijuana in CH's car. Sieverding then cited Amstad and Sharp with frequenting 
pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(d) and told CH, a juvenile, that he would be forwarding 
possession of marijuana charges to the Latah County Prosecutor's Office. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
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The Defendant moves to dismiss, claiming LC. § 37-2732(d) does not apply to 
occupants in a vehicle. The State responds, and respectfully requests this Court to deny 
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Amstad violated LC.§ 37-:-273~(d) because by walking from the dorms to a car in a 
nearby parking lot for the purpose of smoking marijuana, he was present at a place where 
he knew illegal controlled substances were being held for use, delivery, or to be given 
away. The question presented to this Court is whether a person can be "present at or on 
the premises of any place" if they are in a vehicle. Because there is no controlling case law 
on this issue, Defendant has attached two magistrate court's decisions on pre-trial 
motions and an Ombudsman's Report for insight. Although these opinions address a 
similar issue, all three present vastly different factual scenarios than the one we are faced 
with.here. 
A car used for travelling is not a "place" as defined in LC.§ 37-2732(d). In all three 
scenarios the Defendant provided, the individual charged with violating§ 37-2732(d) was 
in a car used for travelling. See Traveller ( officer saw the vehicle pull into a parking lot); 
Reid ( defendant knew there were controlled substances in the vehicle in which she was 
travelling); Ombudsman's Report (students left school, parked in a private lot, and walked 
to get lunch). The significance of using a car to travel is further supported by the emphasis 
all three opinions place on "a fixed location" when defining a "place" or "premises." 
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Here, the stationary Honda in the Wallace complex parking lot was not used for 
traveling, but for smoking marijuana. Unlike the vehicles in the three opinions that were 
used for travelling, CH' s Honda was in a fixed position, parked, stationary, and not even 
running. Not only did CH admit that he lets his friends use his car for smoking marijuana, 
Sharp, the passenger in the backseat, stated that they walked from the dorms to the car 
to smoke marijuana. Based on these facts, the Honda was not used for travel, but as a 
place that the three friends walked to for the purpose of smoking marijuana. 
In addition to the cars being used for travel, none of the three scenarios presented 
any indication that the drugs were going to be anything more than present in the vehicles. 
In fact, in Traveller and the Ombudsman's Report, the vehicles were unoccupied when 
the marijuana was spotted. Also, of the few facts stated in Reid, there was no indication 
that the drugs were anything other than merely present in the travelling vehicle. Here, 
however, there is ample evidence that Amstad and/ or his friends intended to smoke the 
marijuana in the Honda. Not only do we have the admissions that the car is used for 
smoking and that the three walked from their dorms to the car to smoke marijuana, there 
is physical evidence to corroborate those statements. Green marijuana residue was spilled 
over CH's lap, a baggie of marijuana was under the driver's seat, and CH indicated they 
were going to use a large glass bong in the backseat to smoke it. 
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The Ombudsman's Report .expressed concern that an expansive interpretation of 
the statute could cause people to become "trapped." The Report posed _the following 
hypothetical: 
If person' A' wen~ attending a concert at a public concert house, and persons 
sitting near 'A' began smoking marijuana cigarettes, under the 
interpretation put forward by the officer, 'A' could be charged with 
frequenting.' A' probably paid for a ticket to enter the concert venue and 
would be disinclined to leave the concert simply because people in the 
vicinity were smoking marijuana. 'A' may also find the marijuana smoke 
objectionable and disapprove of the activity. Nonetheless, under the 
interpretation put forth by the officers, "A" has a duty to leave the premises 
or risk being charged with frequenting. Under that interpretation, 'A' does 
not have the right to remain in a place open to the public, even if 'A' paid 
for the privilege of.being there." 
Also, the Report indicated that people travelling in cars were considered trapped as well. 
The Report stated, "At one point, Witness #1 asked one of the officers whether the law 
required him to jump out of the car as soon as he knew his friend had drugs. This question 
illustrates the problem of considering a vehicle, particular a moving vehicle, to be 'a 
premises of any place."' 
Although this is a valid concern to raise, it does not apply to the facts presented 
here. Neither Amstad nor any of his friends were trapped in the Honda. Unlike person 
'A' in the hypothetical who paid to enter a venue and was unaware, possibly 
objectionable, to the use of marijuana, Amstad was well aware that CH' s Honda was 
going to be used for smoking marijuana. Even if, arguendo, he was unaware until after he 
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entered the car, he was free to leave after his discovery and walk back to his dorm. 
Instead, he chose to stay and was in no way "trapped." 
Because of these key fact distinctions, the decisions of the Defendant's attached 
opinions should be of little to no persuasion in this case. 
Although plain meaning and the rule of lenity are routinely used to interpret a 
statute, if that interpretation yields absurd results, it is no longer the most reasonable 
interpretation. See e.g., United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) ("No rule of 
construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently ab~urd 
consequences."). 
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd result," 
. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504,509, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 104 
L.Ed.2d 557 (1989), we must search for other evidence of congressional 
intent to lend the term its proper scope. See also, e.g., Church of the Holy 
Trinity, supra, 143 U.S., at 472, 12 S.Ct., at 516; FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 
476 U.S. 426, 432, 106 S.Ct. 1931, 1935, 90 L.Ed.2d 428 (1986). 
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,454 (1989). 
Interpreting LC.§ 37-2732(d) to not include CH's Honda as a "place" would lead 
to absurd results. If CH's Honda is not considered a "place" on these facts, then no car 
could ever be considered a place under this statute. If this happened, it would create a 
loophole sanctuary for not only students, but everyone with access to a car. Under 
Defendant's proposed interpretation, anyone, especially students, could get a group of 
people, walk to their car, use any drug, and be immune from LC.§ 37,.2732(d). Instead of 
gathering inside a building and risking a violation, people could take a couple steps 
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outside to their car and be protected from the statute because it is not a "place." It is true 
that occupants could be charged with other crimes such as possession. However, if one 
occupant claims ownership to everything (as is the case here), the other occupants would 
likely be free to go, even if they partook in using the drugs as well. 
Defendant's interpretation would also lead to absurd results because it would not 
apply to mobile homes, trailers, or RVs. Under Defe~dant's proposed ~terpretation, 
mobile homes, trailers, or RVs would not be considered a "premises" or "place" because 
· they are vehicles. It requires little to no explanation why it would be absurd to exclude 
say, a mobile meth lab, from the definition of "place." 
In addition to absurdity~ courts can also c.onsider potential consequences and 
effects when construing criminal statutes. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690 (2004) ("In 
construing criminal statutes, courts are free to coTIS1der effect and consequence of 
differing and available constructions of a statute."). Right now, as enforcement includes 
cars such as CH' s Honda, students in dorms walk to their cars to smoke marijuana 
because it is difficult to conceal in their rooms. Under Defendant's proposed construction 
of the statute, students will be immune from LC.§ 37-2732(d) if they just simply walk to 
their cars. This creates even more incentive to smoke marijuana in their cars. 
Not only will the increased activity in the parking lots lead to more drug use and 
law violations such as possession, it would create a major risk to society as well. The more 
students that feel free to smoke marijuana in their cars without fear of LC.§ 37-2732(d), 
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the more students who will be behind a wheel. With the convenience of already being 
behind the wheel, there would be little stopping them from driving away while possibly 
under the influence. This interpretation would essentially incentivize students to be 
behind a wheel while under the influence and increase the likelihood of those students 
driving. 
For these reasons, Defendant's proposed interpretation would lead to an absurd 
result and not what the legislature intended. 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny the 
Defendant's Motion fo Dismiss . 
. ~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J 1 day of April, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS was 
_ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
/" hand delivered 
_ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
emailed 
to the following: 
D. RAY BARKER LAW OFFICE 
Andrea Hunter, ISB# 9515 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843-011~ 
Tel: (408) 882-6749 
Dated this d~ of April, 2017. 
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Case No. CR-2017-230 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE 
Based on the findings and conclusions announced in open court; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and 
this case is DISMISSED. 
-· 
"2-0fv h_ f Dated this_·_ day of _J_J_J~, 2017, nunc pro tune to April 27, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the,(} day of [\,J')\\~v~Ol 7, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served, by ±~lass ma~ prepaid, and addressed to, or by 
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by 
facsimile: 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
522 S. Adams St. 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
[ ] First-class mail 
~ Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
Andrea Hunter 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR1S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
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Case No. CR-2017-230 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION 
OF ATTORNEY 
COME NOW the Moscow City Attorney and the Latah County Prosecutor and 
hereby stipulate that the Latah County Prosecutor's Office is substituted for the 
Moscow City Attorney's Office and shall henceforth represent the Plaintiff as the 
attorney of record in the above-entitled action. 
THEREFORE, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that all papers and documents in 
said action are to be served on the Latah County Prosecutor's Office, P.O. Box 8068, 
Moscow, Idaho 83843. 
_//·D~-
1 
(_D _ _ , ..... 5Ji.is ___ day :.~~~-!2:__~---__ ( \ nn_ 
c__...---~---·...-r·· - -~"'.7 _,., ~~-------- I.. \ \;~ 
r .. ~ __ .. .,.,--; ----"-·---1<----· -----~---
William W. ThOil),pfun, lz Rod Hall 
Prosecuting Att€rney ,, Moscow City Attorney 
' --~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION 
OF ATTORNEY were served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Andrea Hunter 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Rod Hall 
Moscow City Attorney 
P.O .. Box 9203 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[]~ 
[q"Hand Delivery 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[] F_JX 
[ '1"Hand Delivery 
Dated this 6'.µ._ day of May, 2017. 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
KEITH SCHOLL 
2011 MAY l O AM 9: 3, 
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DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 10062 
,_, 'J . - '., .,. , 
. 1 . ' . 
tJt ___ r: i:~·~.:·:\· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
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Plaintiff, 
V. 









Case No. CR-2017-0000230' 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
The State ofldaho, by and through Latah County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Keith 
Scholl, submit this Notice of Appeal and hereby appeals the Magistrate Judge's Order 
Dismissing Case. This notice of appeal is made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1 ( c ). 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.4, the State provides the following information: 
(a) The title of the action or proceeding is State ofldaho versus Daniel C. Amstad. 
(b) The title of the court which heard the proceedings appealed from is the Magistrate, 
Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Latah, and the 
presiding magistrate was the Honorable John C. Judge. 
( c) The number assigned to the action of proceedings by the trial court is Latah County Case 
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No. CR-2017-0000230 
( d) The title of the court to which this appeal is taken is the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District, in and for the County of Latah. 
( e) The date of the judgment, decision or order from which the appeal is taken is April 28, 
201 7 as evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court. The hearing and oral pronouncement 
occurred on April 27, 2017. The heading is "Order Dismissing Case." 
(f) The appeal is taken upon matters of fact and law.· 
(g) The testimony and proceedings in the original hearing were recorded by audiotape, 
which is in the possession of the Clerk of the District Court of Latah County. 
(h) A certificate that the notice of appeal has been served personally or by mailing upon the 
opposing party's attorney is attached to this notice. 
(i) The State intends to assert in the appeal that the Magistrate Judge erred in his 
interpretation ofldaho Code 37-2732(d). In particular, the Magistrate erred by holding that a 
parking lot belonging to the University ofldaho where Defendant is alleged to have violated the 
statute does not come within the purview of the statute. 
DATED this \t>~day of May, 2017. 
-~ £d 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Page -2-
-
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal 
was 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
L hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Hon. John R. Stegner 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrea Hunter 
D. Ray Barker Law Office 
Courthouse Mail 
522 S. Adams St. 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this l..Dtlt day of May, 2017. 
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1 MOSCOW, IDAHO, THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2017, AT 3:11 P.M. 
2 
3 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. Uhm, 
4 just let me explain my momentary delay here. One of the 
5 reasons is I-- I got an email, uhm,-- and I'm just 
6 sharing this because it's relevant to the case because I 
7 made an inquiry about legislative history; whether or 
8 not it's relevant or not, I don't know. I mean, I'll 
9 hear-- hear argument, but I guess the-- the good news 
10 or the bad news, depending on how you want to look at 
11 it, is there really isn't significant legislative 
12 history on this, you know, to guide our-- our, uh,--
13 our inquiry. But I wanted to let you know that and 
14 maybe we'll be talking about legislative history and 
15 maybe we won't, but I did want to tell you that. 
16 So, uh, we are on the record in Daniel Amstad, 




THE DEFENDANT: That is-
THE COURT: Correct pronunci-
THE DEFENDANT: -- the traditional way to 
21 pronounce it. 
22 
23 
THE COURT: How do you pronounce it? 




THE COURT: Amstad, okay. 




THE COURT: Okay. I'll pronounce it that way, 
4 Amstad. 
5 Okay. Mr. Amstad is here, represented by Ms. 
6 Hunter. Mr. Ugelstad is here representing the State, 
7 Latah County Prosecutor's Office. With him is Officer 
8 Sieverding. 
9 
MR. UGELSTAD: Uh, Your Honor, it's City of 
10 Moscow. 
11 THE COURT: City of Moscow, I apologize. What 
12 did I say? Oh, you're representing the City of Moscow? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 
14 
THE COURT: Okay. You're sitting in for Ms. 
15 Tomlin? 
16 MR. UGELSTAD: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Great. I'm always-- I'm 
18 always saying that the prosecutors are no longer 
19 fungible, but I guess maybe there is some-- some of 
20 that going on. So, uhm,-- so, is it my understanding 
21 we're just having-- having a legal argument about the--
22 about the application of this statute, is that right? 
-23 But you have Officer Sieverding here from Moscow Police 
24 Department; is he here to testify? 
25 




1 we haven't actually hashed that out yet, so-
2 THE COURT: Just in case. Okay. 
MS. HUNTER: I think we're going to stipulate 
3 
4 to some facts and he didn't know if I was going to 
5 stipulate to some facts, and so, I mean, in-- for the 
6 purpose of arguing the motion. And, so, uhm, he want-
7 wanted to-- I mean, he didn't know if I was going to so 
8 he brought-
9 THE COURT: Okay. So, what are we doing? Are 
10 we stipulating to facts or do you want to just establish 
11 a factual record? 
12 MS. HUNTER: We don't-- I mean, I-- I'm 
13 going to stop speaking for him. 
14 Go ahead. 
15 MR. UGELSTAD: Well, I was going to say, could 
16 we have a moment so we could decide--
THE COURT: sure. 
17 
18 
MR. UGELSTAD: uhm, which-
19 THE COURT: Yeah. 
20 MR. UGELSTAD: Alright. 
21 THE COURT: I mean, I-- I want to-- before--
22 that you have your-- your con-- conversation, but, I 
23 mean, you want to have some factual record here because, 
24 either way, I mean, this-- this is, uh, definitely 
25 subject to appeal. I think there's-- I mean, as-- as 
- 6 -
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1 you know, I mean, there have been different applications 
2 of this statute. It's-- it's kind of mutated, uh, 
3 through a-- a few revisions, uhm, and it's, uhm,--
4 it's got some issues. So, uh,-- and, so, I think, uh, 
5 we'll likely, one way or the other, get some 
6 clarification no matter what I decide from either the 
7 Court or the legislature. So, go ahead and-- do you 





MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
MR. UGELSTAD: Sure, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Just go off the record and 
13 talk about what we want to talk about. 
14 
MR. UGELSTAD: Thank you. 
15 
16 [WHEREUPON THE HEARING WAS RECESSED AT 3:15 
17 P.M., RECONVENING AT 3:17 P.M., COURT, COUNSEL AND THE 
18 DEFENDANT BEING PERSONALLY PRESENT AS BEFORE.] 
19 
20 
MR. UGELSTAD: The State calls Officer 
21 Sieverding to the stand. 
22 
THE COURT: Okay. Officer Sieverding, step on 
23 up please. 
24 
MS. HUNTER: I don't think we're on the 
25 record. 
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THE COURT: Yes, we are. That's what that--
those numbers are. 
MS. HUNTER: Oh, okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. HUNTER: Sorry. 
THE COURT: Yeah, thank you. 
MS. HUNTER: I just thought you went off, so I 
for-
THE COURT: We did, but-
10 
11 
12 back on. 
MS. HUNTER: to announce-
THE COURT: then I think we got-- went 
13 MS. HUNTER: Okay. Just wanted to make sure. 
14 THE COURT: Myranda's right on top of it, I'm 
15 telling you. 
16 MS. HUNTER: She's on the ball. 
17 THE COURT: She's really good. 
18 MR. UGELSTAD: She's on it. 
19 MS. HUNTER: She's very good. 
20 MYRANDA WESTERMAN: Do you solemnly swear or 
21 affirm that the testimony you give in this case shall be 
22 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 
23 under the penalty of perjury? 
24 THE WITNESS: I do. 




1 ahead and have a seat there and then please state your 
2 name and spell your last. 
3 
THE WITNESS: My name is Joseph Sieverding; 
4 that's S-I-E-V, as in Victor, E-R-D-I-N-G. 
5 
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. 
6 Mr. Ugelstad. 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF JOSEPH SIEVERDING 
8 
9 BY MR. UGELSTAD: 
10 
Q Officer Sieverding, where are you currently 
11 employed? 
12 
A Moscow Police Department. 
13 
Q How long have you worked for the Moscow 




A Uh, over five years now. 
Q Can you briefly describe your training? 
A Yes. I graduated from P.O.S.T. Academy. 
18 Uhm, I graduated the F-T-0 program, and I am currently 




Q Does that mean you're P.O.S.T. certified? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. I'd like to turn your attention to 
23 January thirtieth, two thousand seventeen, were you 
24 working that day? 




Q Where were you working at about ten-forty 
2 P.M.? 
3 A The U of I campus, in the dorm Wallace 
4 Complex lot. 






Q What were you duties at that time? 
A Patrol. 
Q What happened at about ten-forty P.M.? 
10 
11 
A I was in the West Wallace Complex parking 
12 lot in my vehicle. I saw a parked vehicle, a parked 
13 Honda with fogged windows in the parking lot. 
14 Q Was that vehicle moving or-- or running? 
15 A Uh, I don't recall if it was running or 
16 not, but it was parked, uh, with the fogged windows.in 
17 the lot. 
18 Q And what did you do next? 
19 A I exited my vehicle. Uh, parked my 
20 vehicle, exited my vehicle, walked up to the Honda, the 
21 passenger side. Uh, when I was about five feet away 
22 from the vehicle, I could smell the odor of-- a strong 
23 odor of marijuana. Uhm,--
Q How strong was that odor? 24 
25 




1 door and the door was actually opened. But when I 
2 walked up, it was-- it was strong. 





Q What did you do after, uhm, knocking on the 
6 window? 
7 A So, I-- I tapped on the passenger side 
8 window. Mr. Amstad opened the door. When the door was 
9 opened, the-- the odor was even stronger. I looked 
10 inside the vehicle with my flashlight and the driver, 
11 uh, Mr. Hughes, stuffed a, uhm,-- a sandwich baggie 
12 under his seat. Uh, when I wa~ looking at Mr. Hughes 
13 with my flashlight, on his lap there was green 
14 marijuana-- what appeared to be green marijuana flake 
15 or residu~ on his pants. 
16 Q And to clarify, uh, what seat was Mr. 




A The pass-- front passenger side. 
Q And Mr. Hughes? 
A Driver's seat. 
21 Q Uh, when you were approaching this vehicle, 
22 did you see anyone-- or at all times, did you see 
23 anyone leave or, uh, enter the vehicle? 
A No. 24 
25 
Q And who was the person that opened the door 
- 11 -
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A Mr. Amstad. 
Q Is that person in the courtroom today? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you please point him out and describe 
6 what he's wearing? 
7 A He's wearing a, uh, collared, uh, black and 
8 white shirt. 
9 Q And where is he sitting? 
10 A He's sitting with, uh, the defense table. 
11 MR. UGELSTAD: Let the record reflect that the 
12 witness has identified the defendant, Mr. Amstad. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 
15 [MR. UGELSTAD CONTINUING) 
16 Q After yous-- after you saw Mr. Hughes 
17 hide the bag, uh, the little baggie, what-- what 
18 happened next? 
19 A So I asked him-- I asked him for the bag 
20 of marijuana. It was pretty evident to me what it was. 
21 Uh, Mr. Hughes handed me the bag of marijuana. I asked 
22 what they were-- I asked for either a pipe or a bong or 
23 what they were going to smoke it with. Uh, without 
24 answering that, he reached into the back seat and handed 




1 Q After he handed you a bong, what happened 
2 after that? 
3 A It was about that time, uh, another 
4 officer, Officer Vincello, arrived. I had the three 
5 males exit the vehicle so I could conduct a search. 
Q Uh, during your search, what did you find? 
A I found, uh,-- in the trunk, I found a 
6 
7 
8 larger-- a gallon size, uh, plastic bag with marijuana. 
9 I think it was over approximately forty-six grams. I 
10 found, uhm, a bong mouth piece in the back seat, which 
11 would go with a bong. I found a pill bottle with 
12 marijuana residue, a jar with marijuana residue, a, uh--
13 like a Ziploc bag box with a bunch more Ziploc bags that 
14 had been, uh, used. There was no residue in those. Uh, 
15 while I was searching, Mr. Hughes gave my partner, 
16 Officer Vincello, a-- a elec-- a digital scale from 
17 his pocket. That's what was recovered. 
18 Q Have you been involved in any drug related 
19 incidents in that parking lot before? 
A Yes. 20 
21 
22 
Q And how many in the last year? 
A Approximately half a dozen within the last 
23 year or so. 
24 Q In those incidents, what was the drug 








Q Did you qharge anyone? 
A Yes. 
Q Uhm, what.were the charges? 
A Possession of marijuana, possession of 
6 paraphernalia and frequenting on-- depending on who the 
7 people were, the different offenses. 
8 
Q In every offense, uhrn,-- or in every 











Q Every single one? 
A Yes. 
Q How many people involved were 
students? 
A All of them, to 
my knowledge. 
Q And how many were living 
in the dorms? 
A All of them, to my knowledge. 
Q Uh, what was the conclusion of-
THE COURT: Can-- can you tell me what the 
19 relevance of that is? 
20 
MR. UGELSTAD: Your-- Your Honor, to 





THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yeah. No,--
THE COURT: It's a place? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Just that, uh, students use 
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THE COURT: Six incidents in the last year? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Uh, for, uh, Mr. Sieverding 
THE WITNESS: Just, uh-- yeah, me 
7 specifically. 
8 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
9 Go ahead~ 
10 
11 [MR. UGELSTAD CONTINUING] 
12 Q After you searched the car, what was the 
13 conclusion of the, uhm, contact? 
14 
A So, I-- I seized the-- the paraphernalia 
15 and the marijuana. And, uh, Mr. Hewes was cited. He 
16 was a minor at the time. Uh, so he was cited for 
17 possession of marijuana and par-- paraphernalia. And 
18 Mr. Amstad was cited for frequenting and there was a 
19 back seat passenger as well, Mr. Sharp. He was cited 






MR. UGELSTAD: Thank you .. 
No further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Hunter. 
MS. HUNTER: Uhm, yes.· 
- 15 -
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION OF JOSEPH SIEVERDING 
2 
3 BY MS. HUNTER: 
4 
Q Uhm, so the parking lot is, uh,-- it says 
5 the south side. Sorry. Maybe you just tell me. Where 
6 is the parking lot in relation to the Wallace Complex? 
7 A It's just to the west, to the Wallace 





A -- or Stadium Avenue. 
Q So, it is a parking lot, uhm,-- uhm, for 
12 the purpose of servicing the people in the West Wallace 
13 Complex? 
14 A Correct. And there's soccer fields on the 
15 other side of it. 
16 Q Okay. So both of those people would use 







Q People who live there and people who--
A Um hmm. 
Q Uhm, and the West Wallace Complex is a 
23 dorm, is that correct? Is that a dorm? Is it a dorm? 
24 
25 
A Yeah, yes. 
Q Okay. I just learned that, so-- uhm, so, 
- 16-:--
-
1 I think-- and six within the past year, and-- and your 
2 experience is that more than other complex, uh, or dorm 
3 parking lots? 
4 A Yeah. Uhm, that one particularly, uh, is 
5 one that it seems like a lot of my contacts for people 
6 using drugs are in that specific parking lot. 
7 Q And, uhm, how many of an-- how many on 
8 average were-- are in other com-- like complex parking 
9 lots, or not complex, but dorm parking lots, like what's 












A Uh, just a hand-- two or three maybe--
Q Per year? 
A for those other complexes, yeah. 
Q Okay. 
A Or other lots. 
Q Okay. Thank you. 
That's all. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Any redirect? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Nothing, Your Honor. 





THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and have a seat there. 












MR. UGELSTAD: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So the State 
MR. UGELSTAD: The State-
THE COURT: its presentation of evidence 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have witnesses to call? 
MS. HUNTER: Not at this time. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Argument? 
11 MR. UGELSTAD: Yes, Your Honor. 
12 The statute, which can be read in the 
13 disjunctive, can read, it shall be unlawful for any 
14 person to be present at any place where he knows illegal 
15 controlled substances are being manufactured, etcetera. 
16 Uh, this is a question about whether a stationary, non-
17 running car parked in a parking lot constitutes as a 
18 place; it's not a question of whether it's premises. 
19 There's no patrol--
20 THE COURT: So-- so you're saying that--
21 that the prem-- the word premises doesn't even apply to 
22 this, uh, analysis? 
23 
MR. UGELSTAD: That-- yes, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: But when-- what do you make of 
25 this prepositional ph-- uh, phrase that. modifies 
- 18 -
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1 premises? It says premises of any place. 
2 
3 
MR. UGELSTAD: It says-
THE COURT: That's-- that's-- that's what 
4 you call, I think, in grammar, an adjectival 
5 prepositional phrase. 
6 
MR. UGELSTAD: It says, uh, to be present at--
7 present at or on-- on premises of any place. So, uhm, 






THE COURT: Well, that's-
MR. UGELSTAD: of a place. 
THE COURT: That-- well, okay. 
MR. UGELSTAD: Well, that-- that's my 
14 understanding, _but-
15 
THE COURT: Alright. I'm-- I'm just trying 
16 to apply grammatical conventions to the way this statute 
17 is written. This-- this-- this issue was actually 
18 addressed in the ombudsman's report in terms of 
19 analyzing the grammatical structure of the sentence, 
20 which is a disaster, honestly. But that-- we're 
21 supposed to read the statute the way it's written. 
22 
23 
MR. UGELSTAD: Right. 
THE COURT: And apply the words as it-- in 
24 terms of their common and ordinary meaning, unless they 
25 are specifically defined. So, I've been-- I looked at 
- 19 -
1 this sentence all morning trying to-~ trying to, 
2 basically, diagram it, and I'm-- I'm not the first, uh, 
3 judge or lawyer or, I guess, ombudsman, who has tried to 
4 decipher what this really means. So, anyway, I'm just 
5 telling you where-- where-- where I've been on this. 
6 And I've-- I've read-- I've read, uh, Judge Kershaw's 
7 opinion, obviously; I've read Judge Clark's opinion on 
8 it; I've read the ombudsman's analysis; I've looked at 
9 the statute; I've looked at other statutes, which direct 
10 us in construing the language of statutes. Uhm, and I--
11 I-- I also looked at, uhm, the other statute, which is 
12 in the same section and, uh, when-- when it involves, 
13 uh, cases where children are present, thirty-~even -
14 twenty-seven thirty-seven A two, in which they 
15 specifically define premises for that particular statute 
16 as including motor vehicle, but they-- they-- they 
17 failed-- the legislature failed to come back and 
18 address the meaning of premises in this context. 
19 But you're saying-- that's why you're saying-
20 that's not why you're saying, but you're saying that-
21 that I don't even have to worry about premises. 
22 MR. UGELSTAD: That's-- that's a-
23 THE COURT: I just need--
24 MR. UGELSTAD: Oh. 
25 THE COURT: I just need to read it in the 
- 20 -
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1 disjunction as, uh, unlawful for any person to be 
2 present at any place or on any premises of any place. 
3 MR. UGELSTAD: That's our position. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. 
5 MR. UGELSTAD: Uhm, and as far as the opinions 
6 you referenced, the, uhm, two magistrate decisions and 
7 ombudsman's report, uh, they were faced with 
8 considerably different facts than we're faced with here. 
9 Uhm, in those opinions, the car there was used for 
10 travel. In, uh, two of the opinions the car was parked, 
11 the occupants left, and then the marijuana was spotted 
12 in the vehicle. Uh, in one of the opinions, uh, State 
13 v. Reid, it's not very clear, but it says that the 
14 defendant acknowledges that there was marijuana in the 
15 traveling vehicle. So, it, uhm-- to-- to us, it seems 
16 that that was not parked and stationary. 
Uhm, in those, also-17 
18 THE COURT: And I-- I-- I didn't hear any--
19 am I to just assume that this was marijuana? I mean, 
20 Officer Sieverding-- Sieverding testified that he 
21 thought it was marijuana or it looked like marijuana, 
22 but I didn't hear him verify it to be marijuana. Is 
23 that something I should consider? 
24 MR. UGELSTAD: Uhm, not at this-- this issue, 





2 THE COURT: Well, except we just have-- we 
3 have a record now of-- of the evidence presented in 
4 support of this motion to dismiss and-- and, uh, there 
5 was no testing of the marijuana or verification that it 
6 was marijuana; it could be some other leafy, green 
7 substance. He just said it was marijuana. He thought 
8 it was marijuana. 
9 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yes, Your Honor, uhm, given his 




THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UGELSTAD: Uhm,--
THE COURT: It could have been oregano? 
14 Probably not, but go ahead. 
15 MR. UGELSTAD: Uhm, and, Your Honor, that, uh, 
I 
16 we-- yeah, sorry. I'll continue. 




19 THE COURT: I'm not trying to throw you off 
20 track. Well, maybe a little, just test--- test--
21 testing your argument. 
22 MR. UGELSTAD: Uh, in those-- also, in those 
23 decisions, the-- the marijuana was just merely present. 
24 Uhm, and, in fact, in two of those decisions, the 




1 There's no incidence-- there's no indication that it's 
2. going to be used, sold, uh, distributed, anything like 
3 that. Uhm, and then here we have the fogged windows, 
4 the marijuana was on the driver's lap, the marijuana bag 
5 was, uh, being hidden under the seat and there's a large 
6 bong, uh, in the back seat. 
7 Officer Sieverding also found over forty-six 
8 grams of marijuana in the trunk, along with various 
9 containers with marijuana residue and paraphernalia. 
10 There was also a scale-
11 THE COURT: There-- there's no evidence on 
12 this record anyway, that Mr. Amstad knew what was in the 
13 trunk. 
14 MR. UGELSTAD: I understand, Your Honor. 
15 However, that, uhm-- that evidence would go towards Mr. 
16 Amstad's knowledge by the odor, how strong the odor was. 
17 Uhm,--
18 THE COURT: Was it-- I didn't hear-- I 
19 didn't hear Officer Sieverding talk about whether the 
20 odor was raw marijuana or smoked-- burnt marijuana. 
21 MR. UGELSTAD: He, uh,-- I believe he said it 
22 was not-
23 THE COURT: Did he say-
24 MR. UGELSTAD: smoked at this time. 






MR. UGELSTAD: I-- I-- I-
THE COURT: It was raw marijuana? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 THE ·coURT: Alright. 
5 MR. UGELSTAD: Uhm, in this case the--
6 Officer Sieverding asked the driver what they used to 
7 smoke it with and, uh, the driver, Christopher Hughes, 
8 handed him a-- the large glass bong in the back. Uhm,-
9 
10 THE COURT: But what he smelled. I'm talking 
11 about what he smelled., what he said he smelled as he was 
12 walking up to the car. I-- I don't remember him 
13 distinguishing, but I could be wrong. Do you remember? 
14 MR. UGELSTAD: I-- I-- I-
15 THE COURT: I-- I don't. 
16 MR. UGELSTAD: I thought he was just-. 
17 THE COURT: I might have missed it. 
18 MR. UGELSTAD: Okay. Uhm, I'm not sure if--
19 if, uh,-- but it was unburned marijuana. Uhm, the 
20 ombudsman report was worried about people being trapped. 
21 They ever kind of quoted one of the defendants saying, 
22 what am I supposed to do? What-- you know, jump out of 
23. the car as soon as I noticed that there's marijuana? 
24 And I can see that's a real concern; however, none of 
25 these facts, uhm, -- there was-
- 24 -
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1 THE COURT: Well, what if it was? Should that 
2 be a concern in a statute like this? Say you're driving 
3 along, somebody-- the driver pulls out a joint, what are 
4 you supposed to do? Are you immediately a criminal 
5 unless you get out of the car? 








THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UGELSTAD: at this time. 
THE COURT: That's fair enough. 
MR. UGELSTAD: And it's-
THE COURT: It doesn't apply to this case. 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yeah. It's just not the--
14 yeah, it's not the issue at hand. 
15 Uhm, and-- but going back to the original 
16 concern, this statutory interpretation question, whether 
17 a car can be a place. Uhm, if the defendant's 
18 interpretation is accepted, which is that a car can 
19 never be a place that you can frequent, it would yield 
20 absurd results. Uhm, it would incentivize everyone, 
21 especially students, especially college students in the 
22 dorms to smoke in their cars and only have the 
23 possibility of a possession charge and that's-- it 
24 could be one person, as it was in this case, where the, 




1 paraphernalia and marijuana. Uh, it would create just, 
2 uh-- hypothetically, if there were people sitting 
3 around a-- a circle, passing a bong around in a parking 
4 lot, uhm, they could be charged with frequenting. 
5 However, now the fact that they're in a car, they're 
6 shielded from this law, it-- it just doesn't make 
7 sense. The, uhm,--
8 
THE COURT: What it they're just in an open 
9 field somewhere? 
MR. UGELSTAD: It still would be-
THE COURT: Is that a-- is that-
MR. UGELSTAD: I-- it's our position-






MR. UGELSTAD: It's our position that would be 
15 a premises or a place. 
16 
17 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UGLESTAD: On-- on the premises or at--









THE COURT: So, I mean, the State's position 
anywhere you are qualifies under this 
statute. 
MR. UGELSTAD: I wouldn't go that--
THE COURT: How-- well, 
how-- where-
MR. UGELSTAD: far. 
THE COURT: Where's the 
line? What's-
MR. UGELSTAD: On these 




1 car in a parked position, not-- not moving, uh, not 
2 running, that would qualify as a place. 
THE COURT: A place in the car? 
3 
4 
MR. UGELSTAD: A place either in the car or on 




THE COURT: And the-- an~ 
MR. UGELSTAD: be distinguished. 
THE COURT: Okay. And the premises-- and, 
9 again, premises has nothing to do with it? 
10 
MR. UGELSTAD: Not in our position, Your 
11 Honor. 
12 
THE COURT: Okay. 
13 
MR. UGELSTAD: Defendant's interpretation 
14 would also, uh, be absurd because it would make all R-
15 Vs, uh, mobile homes and trailers immune from the 
16 statute. That would be including mobile meth labs, 
17 anything of this sort of a vehicle. 
18 Uhm, and lastly, as Your Honor's aware, that 
19 you have ruled on this issue on a similar set of facts. 
20 THE COURT: What if I was wrong? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Uh,-- at-
THE COURT: It's-
MR, UGELSTAD: At the moment,--






MR. UGELSTAD: At the moment, it's-- it's, 
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1 uh, local con-- local authority. 
2 THE COURT: Local precedent? 
3 MR. UGELSTAD: Yeah. Uhm, and in that set of 
4 facts, that there was a-- a car parked in a lot on 
5 Seventh and Elm as designated at lot-- as lot sixty-
6 six, uh, same situation, it was parked, not moving, 
7 officer walked up. Uhm, you stated that it could be 
8 read in the disfunc-- disjunctive and it can be-- and 
9 the, uh,-- the car was a place. Or the-- it was, uh--
10 they were present at a place. For these reasons, Your 
11 Honor, the State requests this Court deny the 
12 defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
13 THE COURT: Alright. 
14 MR, UGELSTAD: Thank you. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ugelstad. 
16 Ms. Hunter. 
17 MS. HUNTER: Uhm, so if I'm understanding the 
18 State's position correctly, you're not worried about the 
19 premises of any place, just a-- just, uhm, be present 
20 at-- and we can cut out or on the premises of. So just 
21 be present at any place, is what he's arguing. Right? 
22 THE COURT: That's what I understand. 
23 
MS. HUNTER: Is that correct? Okay. 
24 THE COURT: We're just-- we're just 












MS. HUNTER: On the 
premises of. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. HUNTER: Okay. 
THE COURT: That present 
at anyplace, we're 
out, or on premises of 
any place. 
MS. HUNTER: Okay. 
THE COURT: Well, no, no, we're not. Let me 
8 see this. Yeah. 




THE COURT: On premises.of-- on premises of. 
MS. HUNTER: Okay. Uhm, so, uh, forgive me. 
12 I-- I might read some of this because I-- I-- I filed 
13 this motion with, uhm, these memos and orders attached 
14 because they did a-- a much better job than I could at 




THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't--
MS. HUNTER: -- unnecessarily complex-
THE COURT: I wouldn't necessarily concede 
19 that, but I-- I have read all those. 
20 
MS. HUNTER: Yes. And, so, it does-- it does 
21 discuss the specific definition of place, how it's, uh, 
22 defined in several dictionaries, and I think he cites 
23 Black's Law Dictionary, uhm, and, uh, says the court 
24 notes the terminology in the statute supports the 




1 geographic location when using these terms.· Uhm, and 
2 then he-- it says if the legislator had meant to 
3 include moveable mobile-- moveable motor vehicles., 
4 presumably the words in or near would have been used. 
5 One is at a house or on land, one is not in or near a 
6 car. And that's, uhm,-- and, you know,-- and.that's 
7 kind of the main focus of my argument, is language of 
8 the statute, uhm, if-- and if the legislators wanted to 
9 include a car, they should have included a car. Like 
10 you stated, there's another, uhm, statute where they 
11 talked about the premises and place and included, uhm,--
12 and-- and made-- and included, uh, a vehicle in that. 
13 Uhm, and they didn't do that in this one. Uhm, this is 
14 an incredibly broad statute. Uhm, I don't think we need 
15 to help make it even broader, uhm, and include words 
16 that aren't in there, uhm, especially when considering 
17 the-
18 THE COURT: I don't think-- I don't think 
19 they're talking about including words. They're talking 
20 about eliminating words. 
21 MS. HUNTER: What do you mean? 
22 THE COURT: In-- in-- so to make it in the 
23 disjunctive, it's either a place or it's a premises of-
24 
25 
MS. HUNTER: Of a place. 




1 MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
2 THE COURT: So, honestly-- I mean, I do think 
3 this is a-- this is kind of a question of, uh,-- it's 
4 a-- it's a question of definition and it's a divi--
5 uh, a question of grammatical structure-
6 MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
7 THE COURT: as much as a legal analysis. 
8 That's why I'm way unqualified to really sort this out, 
9 I think. But, uh, it's really an interesting question 
10 and, you know, I think this is one more example why, as 
11 people say, you shouldn't watch, uh, laws or sausages 
12 being made, because this-- the-- the-- the-- the way 
13 this-- I don't-- there isn't much, uh, legislative 
14 history. And I-- I started by saying that because I 
15 actually tried to find some and there was no, uhm-- you 
16 could only go back so far in Westlaw--
17 MS. HUNTER: Um hmm. 
18 THE COURT: on legislative history. 
19 And I-- maybe you two tried to do that,· and 
20 thinking, oh, there's going to be some discussion about 
21 this. And apparently, there wasn't because-- I mean, 
22 that-- that's why I just ask-- I just asked, is there 
23 any information that-- that-- I looked on the 
24 legislative website. I'm just telling you this to know-






MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
THE COURT: And I asked one of the people who 
3 works in the legis-- legislative-- I said; do you 
4 have-- is there-- can you point me in the right 
5 direction? And I-- I'm just going to tell you this so 
6 you know. What-- what she said is that the-- the 
7 statute was first-- so this is just a summary, which 
8 she really didn't find anything. But she said that, 
9 uhm, it was first written in nineteen seventy-one, but 
10 paragraph D was not added until nineteen seventy-two. 
11 And that's when it said knowingly frequent places where 
12 illegal, uh, was added. And in seventy-seven, it 
13 changed to be present at or on the premises of any 
14 place. And that was because they-- they-- the 
15 legislature-








THE COURT: wanted to make-- make--
impose criminal liability on a single incident, instead 
of the problem with, uh, proving this course of conduct, 
frequenting, whatever that meant. 
MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
23 THE COURT: And, uhm, they didn't have any 
24 discussion. She said she checked the statement of 




1 term premises or the concept, other than to refer to, 
2 quote, the scene of the crime. Now, I-- I-- I'm 
3 referencing the-- the legislative history and, of 
4 course, legislative history can only be referred to 
5 unless-- if you find first that the statute or the 
6 language is ambiguous. Uhm, and, you know, r-~ we'll--
7 we'll get to that. I mean, there's one way to look at 
8 this to find ambiguity and there's another way to look 
9 at it to not find ambiguity; But the problem with 
10 legislative history, as Bart-- I heard Bart Davis once 
11 say is that nobody voted on the legislative history. 
12 The legislative history is really not law. Can it 
13 provide some guidance? Well, the case law says-- yeah, 
14 I mean, you kind of look to a legislative history as a--
15 as a last resort to try to determine legislative intent. 
16 But the best evidence of legislative intent is-- is the 
17 use of their language, because that is the law, that's 
18 what was passed. So, uhm,-- so, yeah, that's-- that's 
19 the-- the frustrating part of this, is this-- this 
20 part~- this phrase of the place and the premises was not 
21 really part of the discussion of the statute. They just 
22 wanted to, uh, eliminate the requirement that they had--
23 that they prove this kind of continuous contact, but I-
24 I-- I would say, it's-- it's fair to say that they 




1 things, uh, I mean, structures, I'm thinking like a drug 
2 house kind of thing. Because part-- part of the-- the 
3 overall discussion historically was about drug 
4 conspiracies and they wanted to bring more people in. 
5 So thit's just sort of the general history. But I don't 
6 know that it has that much relevance to where we are 
7 today, trying to interpret this. So, anyway, sorry for 
8 interrupting. 
9 MS. HUNTER: No, you're fine. Uhm, I 
10 appreciate your insight. 
11 THE COURT: And some of this comes out of the 
12 ombudsman's report and, also, uhm, Judge Clark's, uh, 
13 report because they both talk about the legislative . 
14 history. 
15 MS. HUNTER: Yes, they do. It's interesting. 
16 Uhm, and kind of, uhm, continuing on with 
17 that, uh, how we should interpret, uhm, statutes, uhm, 
18 and what's relevant, uh, you know, legislative history 
19 or not. Uhm, I just want to point out that, uh, the 
20 State v. Martinez, uhm, uh, phra-- phrase that says the 
21 ambiguous criminal statutes must be strictly construed 
22 in favor of the accused, so I just want to throw that 
23 out there as well. 
24 Uhm, so I-- so, I mean, like I-- like I 




1 Dismiss, so you've read all of the, uhm,-- all of the 
2 reasoning, so I won't go into the nuts and bolts of that 
3 other than to say, uhm, you know, the-- the 
4 legislator[sic] would have included it, uhm-- a vehicle 
5 if they wanted to. They knew how to do that. 
6 Uhm, and I want to address some of the State's 
7 arguments. They argue that the car, uhm, is not used 
8 for traveling. Uhm, and I don't think that there is 
9 enough evidence to conclude that. Uhm, Officer 
10 Sieverding said that he couldn't remember whether or not 
11 the car was running. So it was parked but he couldn't 
12 remember if it was running or not, which means their 
13 argument that, well, you know, the other cases, uhm,--
14 you know, the car was running and then it wasn't, so 
15 it's still travel because they were traveling before. 
16 Uhm, I don't think that that really matters, uhm, 
17 because we-- we don't know when the car-- well, based 
18 on the evidence, we don't know when the car last, uhm, 
19 ran, but, uhm, uh,-- I'm sorry, I lost my train of 
20 thought. 
21 And, also, I-- I-- and I don't remember if 
22 he addressed this in his oral argument, but he-- I 
23 think he references it in-- I believe he reference--
24 references it in the response that he filed, uhm, that 
25 the car is one that's known to be something that stores 
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1 marijuana in it. Let me make sure that's accurate. 
2 Uhm, let's see here. Well, maybe he doesn't, but in 
3 case he did and I'm missing it, uhm, there would be--
4 if this were to go to trial, there would be evidence. 
5 And that's the problem, is there would be evidence, uhm, 
6 to the-- to the fact that my client did not know that 
7 this was a place that had marijuana in it, uhm, 
8 regularly. 
9 And I also wanted to address the fact that the 
10 car, uhm, was in a parking lot where, you know, there'd 
11 been-- he-- there'd been a lot of stops for marijuana. 
12 Uhm, this is a parking lot that's att-- that's, uhm, 
13 used for, uhm, students who live in the west com--
14 complex dorm and the West Wallace dorm-- complex, which 
15 is a dorm, and, uh, my client lives in that-
16 You live in that, right? You don't live in 
17 that one? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Humpt um. 





Well, we would establish-
THE COURT: Never mind. 
MS. HUNTER: why he was there. 
THE COURT: I-- yeah. 
24 MS. HUNTER: But it's a dorm. Uh, it's not, 
25 uh,-- people have to use that parking lot. Uhm, it's 
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1 not its only function. 
2 So, uhm, I also want to address the trapped 
3 issue. Uhm, the State acknowledged that it wa~ a good 
4 point that it didn't, uh, apply to the facts here. 
5 Again, were this to go to trial, there's evidence to the 
6 contrary that there, uhm,-- that it would apply here. 
7 Uhm, I don't think there's enough evidence to, uh-- I 
8 don't know that there's enough evidence to conclude that 
9 it doesn't. 
10 Uhm, and then he talks about absurdity and if 
11 this were-- the statute were to con-- to be construed 
12 in the way that, uhm,-- that I ask it to be, then it 
13 would be an absurd result. Uhm, first of all, I think 
14 other counties have it-- I mean, is it-- as I've shown 
15 with the, uhm, decisions in, I think it was Twin Falls 
16 and Bonneville County and, uh, which-- whichever the 
17 other county was, uhm, I don't think it-- I think it's 
18 reasonable to say that it's not absurd if two other, 
19 uhm, judges just in our State, at least, have 
20 interpreted it that way. Uhm,--





mean, this-- this has been going on for so long, that--
MS. HUNTER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: nobody took it up. 













MR. UGELSTAD: Yeah. I don't know. 
MS. HUNTER: That is 
interesting. I've 
that, too. 
THE COURT: Ms. Tomlin,--
MS. HUNTER: Like why--
THE COURT: you--
what-- what--
MS. HUNTER: has this 
not been decided. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. TOMLIN: Well, I have 
some insight on 




THE COURT: Insight for-
MS. TOMLIN: for me to address the Court. 
THE COURT: an-- is--
are you:--- are 

















Uhm, not at all. 
No. Okay. 
But it has been some-
Go ahead. 
Uhm, it-- it is something that 
21 has come up from my perspective, and so I can share 
22 those insights and-- as to why, uhm-- how those cases 
23 were dealt with and why this case is now in front of you 
24 here in this court again and-- and you're being asked 




1 issue to the city at all. 
2 THE COURT: Well, it's not a new issue to--
3 obviously, because of these other decisions. It's not a 
4 new issue since this statute was passed. 
5 MS. TOMLIN: And,-- absolutely. So, uh, 
6 there's been opportunities in the pretrial room for 
7 negotiation based on these reports and this question was 
raised-8 
9 THE COURT: Well, but I'm talking about the 
10 development of a law. 
11 MS. TOMLIN: I understand that. 
12 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, the legislature 
13 hasn't addressed it and the Supreme Court or the Court 
14 of Appeals hasn't addressed it and I'm not aware of a 
15 district court that has addressed it, unless you all 
16 tell me otherwise, which if that-- all I'm saying is 
17 that's surprising to me--
18 MS. TOMLIN: I agree. 
19 THE COURT: that this statute hasn't been 
20 addressed and-- and-- and my guess is that it's not 
21 worth it, given the level of the charge, for people to 
22 do that. All-- but I would-- would have thought a--
23 you know, a public defender's office would have, you 





1 MS. TOMLIN: Sure. 
2 THE COURT: what the-- what the Supreme 





MS. TOMLIN: No, I won-
THE COURT: I'm just-- I curious about it. 
MS. TOMLIN: I wondered the same thing. 
THE COURT: I mean, I've thought about this 
8 now for a while. Not the first time, as Mr. Ugelstad 
9 points out. 
MS. HUNTER: Right. Uhm, so-10 
11 
THE COURT: I love having an old decision that 
12 I made seven years ago, like-
13 
14 
MS. HUNTER: So you can see how you-
THE COURT: presented to me in the way that 
15 I'm bound by my own precedent, which is very good to do 
16 that. But I-- I-- I had to go back. I-- yeah. I 
17 mean, I actually-- I kind of remembered it, once I 



























since two thousand ten. 







THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. HUNTER: been able to see that. But, 
uh, so I can't really distinguish it from this case 
4 because I haven't seen it. But, uhm, the other reason I 
5 don't think it would be an absurd, uhm, result is just 
6 because he-- that, you know, they-- uh, you wouldn't 
7 be subject to, uhm, the subsection D, uhm, in this 
8 statute but you'd be subject to every other-- you'd be 
9 subject to the possession aspect and all of the-- you 
10 know, there's several, uhm, uh, sections that still 
11 apply. And you could, uhm-- and, you know, you might 
12 have to work a little harder to prove it, to prove that 
13 there had been something bad going on, but I don't think 
14 it's absurd. 
15 Uhm, also, they brought up the, uhm,-- the 
16 point that they-- that they believed that mobile homes 
17 and trailers and R-Vs would be, uhm, now not subject to 
18 this, uhm,-- to this statute-- to this section of the 
19 statute, which I don't agree with. Uhm, mobile homes 
20 and trailers, uhm, if they're attached to land, are 
21 regularly, uhm, interpreted to not be a vehicle, even-
22 and I-- and I-- and I can't-- I-- I didn't go 
23 through and look-- and look at all the statute-- all 
24 the places that it would-- it does, uhm, indicate that, 




1 because I've done some bankruptcies and you-- and it's 
2 section-- Idaho Code section fifty-five - one thousand 
3 one subsection two, if you're interested, but, uhm, it 
4 does-- you can exempt a mobile home, even if it's not 
5 attached to the land yet. So, uhm, I-- I-- I don't 
6 think that you would have to strictly interpret a mobile 
7 home and a trailer to be a vehicle. I don't think that 
8 that's true. And I think that's a little bit of a scare 
9 tactic to bring up a mobile meth lab. I think that, 
10 uhm,-- that there would be a way to bring a mobile meth 
11 lab down. Uhm,--
12 THE COURT: Yeah. I don't-- I don't think 





MS. HUNTER: Frequenting. 
THE COURT: frequenting as the charge. 
MS. HUNTER: I would think that they would 
18 have bigger fish to fry. 
19 THE COURT: Probably. 
MS. HUNTER: But, uhm,--
THE COURT: One could speculate. 
20 
21 
22 MS. HUNTER: Yes. Uhm, so,-- and he also--
23 I don't think he brought it up in his oral argument, but 
24 in his motion, he talks about how this would drive kids 




1 bad for the public. I think that, uhm, maybe kids would 
2 smoke in cars more, but I would think that would be--
3 make it easier for the cops to find them than if 
4 they're, uhm, found-- found in other remote location or 
5 their room or wherever else they do it. Uhm, so I don't 
6 understand why they don't go to Pullman, but, uh,-- but 
7 anyway, so-
8 
THE COURT: Well, then they'd have to drive 
9 back stoned. 
10 
11 
MS. HUNTER: Right. That's true. 
THE COURT: That's the other-- that's the 
12 ot0er, uh, demon that Mr. Ugelstad raises, is that we'd 
13 be encouraging, uh, students to get high and drive under 
























You don't have to respond to that. 
No, no, no. 
I'm just saying,--
I-- I-
That's one of the things-
I've got-
That's one of the-
No, I-
One of the-




1 and that's what made me think of the Washington 
2 thing, because I'm like, well, they drive to Washington 
3 to get-- to get high and drive home, so, uhm, you know, 
4 if we're trying to de-incentivize that or prevent that, 
5 then, you know,-- I don't-
6 
THE COURT: Maybe we could charge people with 
7 driving under the influence. 
8 




THE COURT: There's that. 
MS. HUNTER: you could use. Uhm, so, 
12 anyway, uh, I-- I guess that's my-- the last of my 
13 response to his-- to his arguments. And, so, uhm, like 
14 you said, it's an interesting issue that's uh-- that's, 
15 uhm,--_ and I-- and I was surprised that it hadn't 
16 been, uhm,-- that it hadn't been appealed either. But, 
17 uhm,-- but I think that it's-- it's good to address it 
18 now and figure out what we want to do with it for now. 





THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Do you want to respond to anything? 
MR. UGELSTAD: Just two things, Your Honor. 
24 Uhm, a lot of the points that defense counsel has 
25 brought up is, uhm-- and-- and she even said, are 
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1 issues for trial and-- and not to be, uhm,-- have any 
2 weight in this statutory interpretation argument. Uhm, 
3 also the other counties that were presented, or that 
4 have ruled on this issue, were not presented with these 
5 facts. Uhm, these are very specific facts where the car 
6 was parked and not moving, uhm, running or not running, 
7 it's still not moving. It's parked and stationary and 
8 very different facts from the other counties. 













THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. 
MS. TOMLIN: Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. TOMLIN: If I may just add a little bit 
from the city's perspective that, uhm, would 
in what Mr. Ugelstad argued. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TOMLIN: May I do that? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. TOMLIN: Thank you. Uhm, in the past, 
20 there have been some frequenting cases that, uhm, did, 
21 uh,-- were charged with a moving vehicle and, in the 
22 pretrial room, I was faced with these same, uhm, 
of 
23 pleadings and trial court rulings and ombudsman reports 
24 and I did consider those and, uhm, ultimately, I 




1 THE COURT : Yeah. 
2 MS. TOMLIN: -- I agreed that the vehicle was 
3 moving and I couldn't identify it as a place. And so I 
4 wanted this Court to know that this is one of, uh,--
5 well, it's the first case I've had with frequenting 
6 where-
7 THE COURT: I wish we could come up with 
8 another-- because it's not a frequenting statute. 
9 MS. TOMLIN: It-- you're right. And-
10 THE COURT: It hasn't been a frequenting 
11 statute forever. I don't know what-- what do we call 
12 it? 
13 MS. TOMLIN: I have to retrain my brain, but I 
14 understand that it's not frequenting. So, being in a 
15 place where drugs were used, stored, manufactured; I 
16 think it gets wordy to say. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MS. TOMLIN: So, we need a better catch 
19 phrase. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah. 
21 MS. TOMLIN: But, uh, regardless of, uhm, 
22 whether we're calling a rose by another name or not, I 
23 do think that, uh, when this issue was presented to the 
24 city by Ms. Hunter and, uhm, Mr. Amstad, uhm, I reread 
25 these and then I reread the facts and I understand that 
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1 Mr. Ugelstad took the reins on this and did a lot of 
2 research, and so 'he's in the weeds where I'm-- I'm not 
3 and-- and so, uh, he might be in a better position to 
4 answer some of the questions, but the distinguishing 
5 points for me in terms of not dismissing this as quickly 
6 as I had dismissed the others, where the vehicle was in 
7 motion. Based on the persuasiveness of the, uhm, 
8 statutory interpretation presented by Ms. Hunter, I 
9 really could not get past a couple details, and those 
10 were that, uhm, the vehicle was stationery and that it 
11 was in a lot. And I tried to analogize the vehicle to 
12 something else that maybe would be a canopy of sorts for 
13 people who are trying to hide and maybe get away from an 
14 R-A or someone else who does the mandatory reporting. 
15 That's where my mind went. And so, I was like where--
16 now what would this be? So I thought of the camper down 
17 Elms on campus. I thought of a couple other places that 
18 students might feel a little bit more insulated in terms 
19 of hiding to, uhrn-- to smoke pot. And when I, uh, read 
20 the facts and I knew that they were stationary and I 
21 knew that they were in this parking lot and that Officer 
22 Sieverding, uhm,-- and only Officer Sieverding-- I can 
23 only speak to the incidences that he has, uhm, dealt 
24 with in that parking lot, but-- and-- and the times 




1 didn't testify to that so I don't want to put words in 
2 his mouth or let this Court, uhm, hear something that I 
3 can't be sure of, but it's not all the time. And, so, 
4 within this timeframe, it's only, uhm, you know, six or 
5 seven, but I think that that's somewhat significant 
6 because he knows it's a place or premises, which is, uh, 
7 buildings or land or appurtenances attached to 
8 something, right? That's a premises? So,--
9 
10 
THE COURT: I don't know what a premises is. 




THE COURT: That's what I'm going to-
MS. TOMLON: Yes. 
14 
THE COURT: That's what I'm going to try and 
15 divine. 
16 
MS. TOMLIN: Yeah. A premises, uh,-- a 
17 premise is, uhm,-- or premises is-








MS. TOMLIN: What is-
THE COURT: Ugelstad is saying-
MS. HUNTER: A premises is--
THE COURT: premises has--
MS. HUNTER: Premises is-
THE COURT: nothing to 
do with this. 





1 did contemplate it. 
2 
3 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TOMLIN: And I'm not saying that he's 
4 wrong, but I did contemplate it because it's part of--
5 it's part of what helps me understand what a place is. 
6 And, so, when I'm reading that in the language of the 
7 statute, uhm, I think that-
8 
9 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TOMLIN: a parking lot is a place. 







THE COURT: Is a parking lot a premises? 
the-- that's part of the question. 
MS. TOMLIN: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TOMLIN: It is attached to the dorm. 
And, 
16 uhm, it says in the definition of 'premises, that it's, 
17 uhm, _:.... 
18 
THE COURT: I don't know. Where's the 






MS. TOMLIN: Well, I'll-- I'll go get it for 
THE COURT: No. I'm not going to-
MS. TOMLIN: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to let you guys 
25 double up like this. 
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1 MS. TOMLIN: Yeah. 
2 THE COURT:. I mean-
3 MS. TOMLIN: I don't want to double up. 
4 THE COURT: I'-m getting a totally different 
5 argument now, from you. 
6 
MS. TOMLIN: Well, I agree with his argument 
7 in many respects, but I'm telling you where I came to in 
8 terms of not dismissing it outright and handing the 
9 reins to him, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Right. 
11 MS. TOMLIN: And the other thing-- I won't 
12 talk about that anymore, because I understand. That's 
13 not what I'm trying to do. But let me tell you the--




THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TOMLIN: And that was, uhm, that the 
18 windows were fogged up. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. 
20 MS. TOMLIN: And I-- I stayed on that for a 
21 while. And the reason I did is because it indicated 
22 that there was time. You asked Mr. Ugelstad earlier, 
23 and I like his response, because he said he didn't have 
24 to answer that question or wasn't prepared to in terms 




1 be-- let's say they're in a moving car and someone 
2 lights up a joint, at what point do they, you know, get 
3 to say, let me out, I don't want to be implicated or, 
4 you know-
5 
THE COURT: So because the windows are foggy, 
6 it means they've been in the car for a long time smoking 
7 marijuana? 
MS. TOMLIN: 8 




I am not jumping that fa,r with 
Okay. 
But what I am saying-




13 MS. TOMLIN: is that 
it indicates a period 
14 of time, uhm, in which, uh, there was some knowledge. 
15 And so then the next-
16 THE COURT: It.depends on how cold it was, who 
17 was in there, what was going on in there. 
MS. TOMLIN: I understand that. 18 
19 THE COURT: I mean, it-- it could be so many 
20 different things. 
21 
22 
MS. HUNTER: Your Honor, I'm-- oh, sorry.' 
MS. TOMLIN: So, then the next thing, Your 
23 Honor, is that the, uhm,-- this-
24 
25 




1 THE COURT: I mean, I-- I don't know. I 
2 mean, I-- I don't know. I mean, and I don't even-- I 
3 don't have a clear record, even, of whether it--














Or burnt marijuana. 
I understand. 
Or marijuana smoke. 
I understand that wasn't in 
11 record. I'm just letting you know where I came to, 
12 because past cases were dismissed when I felt like 
13 there-- that what you've been presented with was 
the 
14 compelling and I'm trying to just help you understand 
15 what-- that-- that I understand the discrepancies and 
16 the city understands those discrepancies and that there 
17 was a-- a place here, uhm, that, I think, went past 
18 those. And, then, I'm not going to--
19 THE COURT: And that-- and that-- and that 
20 your line was the fact that the car was stationary in 
21 the parking lot? 
22 
23 
MS. TOMLIN: That was critical to me. 
THE COURT: That made a difference in your 
24 analysis of whether or not you should pursue the case? 
25 MS. TOMLIN: It did. And then, uhm, Mr. 
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1 Amstad sitting in-- if he had been sitting in the back 
2 seat, that would be really significant to me in terms 
3 of-- we probably would have-- I-- I don't know where 




THE COURT: Mr. Sieve--
MS. TOMLIN: next to-
THE COURT: Officer Sieverding says that's 
8 where they grabbed the bong. 
9 
MS. TOMLIN: Well, there was raw marijuana, 
10 uhm, on the lap of the driver. 
11 
THE COURT: I mean, there was-- there was--
12 there was presumed marijuana on the lap of the driver. 
13 
MS. TOMLIN: I understand that that's what 
14 was-
15 
THE COURT: It was not confirmed to be 
16 marijuana, according to the officer's testimony. 
17 
MS. TOMLIN: I understand what the record 
18 indicated. I just wanted to let you know-
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. TOMLIN: my thoughts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 





23 THE COURT: I mean, 
I can't-- I can't analyze 
24 a case based on, well, we didn't prosecute all these 














know you're not saying that. 
Okay. 
COURT: You're saying, this is 
where the 
4 
5 line is, 
THE 
but that's--
6 figure out here. 
I mean, that's what I have to 




MS. HUNTER: I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: Did you want to say something 
11 else? Is that-
12 
MS. HUNTER: Yeah, I did, Your Honor. Because 
13 I feel like this is hinging on facts and I feel like I 
14 should be able to offer facts, if they're going to base 
15 it on facts that, honestly, aren't the case. 
16 
THE COURT: I'm not going to consider anything 
17 that's not part of the record. 
18 
19 
MS. HUNTER: Okay. 
THE COURT: And the only thing that's part of 
20 the record is what Officer Sieverding test-- testified 
21 to. 
22 
MS. HUNTER: Right. Well, I-- would you, uh-
23 would you be okay with me putting my client on to 
24 establish other facts? Because this isn't-- and I-- I 







THE COURT: Well, if the-- if-
MS. HUNTER: said-
THE COURT: the other facts-- and you--
4 you alluded to this, which isn't part of the record, 
5 that-- that at trial, it-- it-- this would be an 
6 issue, whether or not he knew, and that-- that's a 
7 legitimate question. I-- I would-- I would say, just 
8 to kind of put everybody at ease, in terms of this 
9 Motion to Dismiss, I think-- I think I really have to 
10 construe the facts that are established, that are in the 
11 record, in a light most favorable to the State. So that 




















a jury question anyway. 
I wasn't going to-
I'm talking about--
ask him. 
I'm talking about a legal 
analysis 





MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
THE COURT: About the application of this 
MS. HUNTER: Sure. I-- I get that, Your 
24 Honor. But, uhm, I-- and I wasn't going to go into 




1 that's a factual issue. But whether or not the car was 
2 moving and was a mode of transportation-- and I can 
3 tell you what he would say, and if you want to cons--
4 if you want him to put it on the record so you want to 
5 consider it, we can do that. They were planning on 
6 going-- going to Walmart. They were on their way. 
7 Uhm, they were trying to decide what to do next. They--
8 and they were going to go to Walmart. Also, I-- and--



















THE COURT: I-- I don't-
MS. HUNTER: That-- that's fine. 
MR. UGELSTAD: Yeah, your-- Your 
Honor,--
MS. HUNTER: But I would at least 
like-
THE COURT: Well, it's not part of-
MR. UGELSTAD: That's not-
MS. HUNTER: to say. 
THE COURT: the record right now. 
MR. UGELSTAD: That's not part of the 
record. 
MS. HUNTER: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. HUNTER: And if-- and--
and if you don't 
to be part-- if you don't want it--
me to put 
THE COURT: Uh, it's not what-





1 STATEMENT UNINTELLIGIBLE, COURT SPEAKING AT THE SAME 
2 TIME.] 
3 THE COURT: -- I want or don't want, it's just 
4 what is-
5 MS. HUNTER: Okay. 
6 
7 
THE COURT: -- right now. And-- and I-
MS .. HUNTER: Well, then I-
8 THE COURT: I can tell-- I can tell you like 
9 whatever the intentions were of the people in the car 
10 about the mobility of the car, I don't think it's 
11 particularly relevant to the-- to the legal analysis. 
12 MS. HUNTER: Okay. Well, then I'd at least 
13 like to point out that it wasn't established that the 
14 car was-
15 THE COURT: Yeah. 
16 MS. HUNTER: 
not running. Uhm, and I'd 
17 also like-
18 THE COURT: And I-- I agree. 
MS. HUNTER: And I'd also-19 
20 
THE COURT: It was not established one way or 
21 the other. 
22 MS. HUNTER: Right. And--
23 THE COURT: The car may have been running. 
24 
MS. HUNTER: Yes. And I'd also like to, uh, 




1 that it was a lot different from, uhm,-- from these 
2 other cases, because it wasn't'moving. Uhm, and the 
3 other cars weren't moving either. They had been moving, 
4 uhm, possibly, and, uh,--
5 THE COURT: Well, I-- I do think that-- I 
6 can't remember which case it was, the guys were in the 
7 alley and one guy was charged just because he said-~ 
8 even though he wasn't in the car, that-- and it was a 
9 parked car in a parking lot. 
10 MS. HUNTER: Um hmm. 
11 THE COURT: And he said, I-- I knew there was 
12 marijuana in the car. 
13 
14 
MS. HUNTER: Sure. 
THE COURT: I can't-- it's one or the other--
15 it was-- it was either Judge Kershaw's case or Judge 
16 Clark's case. 
17 MS. HUNTER: Yeah. I'm not good with names, 








THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. HUNTER: tell you which, uh, 
circumstances it went with. So, anyway, uh, so that's 
my rebuttal to that. And in terms of, uhm,-- of the--
or, well, I guess I won't address that because you 
already kind of did. So, yeah, that's all I want to 
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1 say. Thank you. 
2 THE COURT: Alright. Thank you. 
3 Well, I mean, there's a lot of kind of 
4 surrounding facts that we could all argue about. A lot 
5 of those-- a lot of those would-- would have to be 
6 resolved at trial, as I just said. I think for purposes 
7 of the Motion to Dismiss, filed by the defense, that I 
8 have to-- I have to really construe the facts in a--
9 in a light most favorable to the State on any kind of 
10 motion to, uh-- motion to dismiss because, uh, so many 
11 of these questions, uhm, are for a jury or these--
12 well, these questions. And I think what I'm-- I'm left 
13 with for purposes of making t~is decision is the fact--
14 facts that, uh, we're on the University of Idaho campus 
15 in a parking lot that's associated with Wallace Complex, 
16 but also has other purposes, like servicing the soccer 
17 field, uh, that Officer Sieverding sees fogged windows, 
18 attracts his attention. He smells marijuana, whether--
19 I'd have-- I'd have to check the record, whether it's--




As he gets closer to the car, he smells it more 
strongly. He knocks on the passenger's window. 
Amstad, who's identified, opens the door. The--
Mr. 
the 
24 smell is, uh, much stronger, uh, thus_, giving him 




1 in the driver's seat, putting the-- the baggie, which 
2 he presumes to be marijuana based on his training and 
3 experience. Also, sees fla-- uh, uh, green flakes, 
4 also presumed to be marijuana based on his training and 
5 experience. And then searches the car, uh, gets the 
6 bong, uh, finds some presumed marijuana, also fin9s 
7 presumed marijuana in the trunk. I think that's 
8 probably pretty straightforward recitation of the facts 
9 that are sufficient for me to access whether or not this 
10 statute, the way it's written, applies-- applies to 
11 this case. And I'm-- I'm saying.that also for purposes 
12 of appeal because whatever-- whatever I do here, I 
13 think, you know, could be-- may be appealed, because in 
14 some ways, I think every judge who's addressed this 
15 issue is inviting appeal in a way because, uh, this 
16 statute is very poorly written. Uhm, it's uh-- it's 
17 unclear. I don't know if it's ambiguous or not. I'm 
18 going to analyze it both ways. Uhm, and I'm going to 
19 just tell you kind of how I-- how I proceeded through 
20 this. And I-- I, basically, did this this morning, uh, 
21 because- I don't know how I had the time but, I mean, it 
22 wasn't all morning but I just started grabbing, uh, 
23 things to figure out what these words mean. Uh, because 
24 I'm-- I was genuinely curious and genuinely confused 
25 about it. Uh, and the-- and the language is that we--
- 60 -
000138 
1 we need to analyze here. And it really is kind of an 
2 exercise in sentence diagraming. It shall be unlawful 
3 for any person to be present at or on premises of any 
4 place where he knows illegal controlled substances are 
5 being manufactured or cultivated or are being held for 
6 distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, 
7 use or to be given away. 
8 And so the-- the heart of the question is 
9 that as, uh, Mr. Ugelstad would argue that it could be 
-10 read in its edited form as it shall be unlawful for any 
11 person to be present at any place where he knows illegal 
12 controlled substances are being used. 
13 Ms. Hunter would argue that it should be read 
14 as it shall be unlawful for any person to be present at 
15 or on premises of any place where he knows illegal 
16 controlled substance-- substances are being used. 
17 So that is an issue of statutory 
18 interpretation in terms of the meaning of the words and 
19 grammatical structure of the sentence, in my opinion. 
20 And all of these decisions have-- have addressed that. 
21 And I think the-- I think the, uh,-- this is na--
22 [PAUSE]. I wrote his name down here somewhere. Pierce 
23 Murphy. He may not be a lawyer. I don't think he's a 
24 lawyer, maybe he is. The community ombudsman actually 




1 that-- that Mr. Murphy is kind of a grammarian, maybe, 
2 uh, and he parsed it out that way. And he's the one who 
3 correctly identified, of any place, as a prepositional 
4 phrase. That's what it is. Of, which is a preposition, 
5 any place modifies premises. It's-- it's adjectival. 
6 That's-- that is-- that is, uh,-- that is basic 
7 grammar and I-- so I grabbed my Chicago Manual of 
8 Style, fifteenth edition. Because I don't really-- I'm 
9 not a grammarian. And I thought, well, what does that 
10 mean? A prepositional phrase consists of a preposition, 
11 its object and any words that modify the object can be 
12 used as a noun, an adverb or an adjective. We call this 
13 an adjectival phrase; i.e., the cathedrals of Paris. 
14 So-- and, generally, a phrase follows the last element 
15 of the compound. So, it's-- the placement of the 
16 preposition is significant in terms of interpretation. 
17 So because-- because it is-- it is that prepositional 
18 phrase that modifies premises, premises of any place, 
19 it's not grammatically correct to read this in the 
20 disjunctive as, to be present at any place. It's not--
21 it's not-- the sentence is not set up to be 
22 disjunctive. And when I was considering this way back 
23 in two thousand ten in the State v. Lamb case, I read it 
24 that way and I think I was wrong grammatically. I don't 
25 think that was a correct analysis of the-- of the 
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1 grarnmari-- of the-- of the structure of the sentence. 
2 And I'm not trying to·parse this. I'm not making this 
3 up. This is the-- this is the-- this is basic, uh, 
4 grammar. And I don't think we-- when we're-- when 
5 we're reading statutes we get to disregard that. So, 
6 then, there's that. Okay. So, that means premises has 
7 a role to play in the meaning of this statute and the 
8 interpretation of this statute. 
9 Now, we all know that we have to, uh,-- to 
10 apply the plain, ordinary meaning of-- of-- of words, 
11 uh, that are used in statutes, uh, and if they're 
12 specifically defined in the-- in the statute, we have 
13 to use those words the way we commonly use those words. 
14 So, like these other judges, I went to the dictionary. 
15 First, I went-- I went to Black's Law Dictionary, 
16 because we are talking about the law. This is my-- my 
17 Black's Law Dictionary from law school. It's the fifth 
18 edition. I'm sure it's been updated, but I don't think 
19 it-- uh, this definition of premises has changed 
20 significantly since that time, except as otherwise 
21 defined in this statute. [PAUSE] So, besides other 
22 definitions, which don't apply like in logic in terms of 
23 a premise, this is defined as lands and tenements, an 
24 estate including lands and buildings thereon, the 
25 subject matter of a conveyance, the area of land 
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1 surrounding a house, and actually, by our legal 
2 construction, forming one encl- enclosure with it, a 
3 distinct and definite locality and may mean a room, 
4 shop, building or other definite area - maybe a parking 
5 lot or a distinct portion of real estate. Okay. So 
6 that is Black's Law Dictionary. 
7 And then I thought, well, I'll look in-- this 
8 is an American Heritage Dictionary, Second College 
9 Edition. Such a [UNINTELLIGIBLE WORD] law, I mean, it 
10 is-- it's really fascinating. Aside from the logic, 
11 uh, definition, premises are defined as land and the 
12 buildings upon it, ~ building or part of a building. 
13 So, I-- I-- I would say that, generally speaking, the 
14 commonly used definition or the common definition of the 
15 word premises is related to land and structures or--
16 or, uh, land associated with structures. 
17 Uhm, I looked for other definitions, uhm, in 
18 the-- in the Idaho Code. I did find one in, uh, the 
19 definitions. This is under twenty-three - one thousand 
20 one, defining a premises where people can sell beer, 
21 which is kind of an-- you know, there's a little bit of 
22 an analogy there, I guess, with-- with, uh, places--
23 premises where drugs might be held. In this case it's 
24 alcohol. This is in, uh, twenty-three dash one thousand 




1 and contiguous property owned or leased or used under 
2 government permit by a licensee as part of the-business 
3 establishment, etcetera. So, that definitely, uh, talks 
4 about building and contiguous property. We all know the 
5 case law on interpreting statutes and of-- you know, 
.6 first, before we can even go to legislative history or 
7 engage in statutory interpretation, we have to-- we 
8 have to apply the-- the plain language of-- of the 
9 statute. And there's actually a statute on this, which 
10 I actually didn't know about. Uh, it's-- it's in, uh, 
11 construction of statutes. It's a statute, seventy-three 
12 dash one one three. The language of a statute should be 
13 given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Where a 
14 statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent 
15 of the legislature shall be given effect without 
16 engaging in statutory construction. The literal words 
17 of a statute are the best guide to determining 
18 legislative intent. That's what the legislation tells 
19 us. If a statute is capable of more than one 
20 conflicting construction, the reasonableness of the 
21 proposed interpretation shall be considered and the 
22 statute must be construed as a whole. Interpretations 
23 which would render the statute a nullity or which would 
24 lead to absurd results are disfavored, as Mr. Ugelstad 




1 the context and improved use of the language. But 
2 technical words and phrases and such others as have 
3 acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law are 
4 defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed 
5 according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or 
6 definition. That's an-- in-- then in seventy-three 
7 one one four, there are particular words that are 
8 defined, none of which include premises or motor 
9 vehicle. Although we know that motor vehicle is defined 
10 elsewhere in the statute for particular purposes. And 
11 one of the things I found interesting, as I alluded to 
12 before, is thirty-seven - twenty-seven thirty-two-- not 
13 thirty-two, I'm sorry. Thirty-seven - twenty-seven 
14 thirty-seven A, which was enacted after-~ well after 
15 thirty-seven - twenty-seven thirty-two D. So this was 
16 enacted in nineteen eighty-- nineteen ninty-one, then 
17 revised in two thousand six. Thirty-seven - twenty-
18 seven thirty-seven A, uh,-- and this is, uh, the 
19 statute regarding manufacture or delivery of controlled 
20 substance where children are present, specifically 
21 defines premises, but only as used in this section-- as 
22 used in this section, motor vehicle or vessel is part of 
23 the-- is-- is included in the definition of premises. 
24 Also, dwelling or rental unit, including but not limited 
25 to, apartment, townhouse, condominium, mobile home, 
- 66 - 000144 
1 manufactured home, motel room or hotel room. And C, 
2 dwelling house, its curtilage, and any other 
3 outbuildings. 
4 So, that's kind of where I wandered through 
5 these-- through these statutes, through these 
6 definitions. So, this is where-- this is where I come 
7 down on this. I think that it cannot be read in the 
8 disjunctive because it's a-- an adjectival preposition 
9 phrase of any place modifying premises. Under the 
10 circumstances of this case, I am not finding that a 
11 parking lot, even though it might be associated with a 
12 dorm which houses many, many people, can be considered a 
13 premises. I don't think that any place applies, uhm, to 
14 this, and I have to apply this statute as written. I 
15 think it-- I-- I think this is beyond, uh, what could 
16 be fairly used in this particular factual situation. 
17 There's certainly others where it could be used, when 
18 associated with more of what could be fairly defined as 
19 a premises. Uh, I think I am persuaded by the reasoning 
20 of Judge Kershaw, by Judge Clark and by the ombudsman. 
21 I'm not fully, but, uh,-- but mostly on this-- on this 
22 issue of, uh, word meaning and sentence structure. And 
23 in terms of the potential of sur-- you know, rendering 
24 an, uh, nullity, I don't think that this interpretation 
25 does render the statute a nullity. I think it could 
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1 still apply in many, many circumstances, just not this 
2 circumstance. And in response to the potential 
3 absurdity of having, you know, a parking lot filled with 
4 college students smoking marijuana, I think there are 
5 two ways to go about dealing with that. Uh, monitor the 
6 parking lot more carefully, uh, or go to the legislature 
7 and fix this statute, which I, again, am surprised that 
8 nobody has thought to do to clarify it because it could 
9 be easily clarified, or appeal my decision and see what 
10 the Supreme Court says about it. Uhm, I'm reminded of 
11 something that I heard Justice Scalia say once at the 
12 Bellwood Lecture many years ago, here at the University 
13 of Idaho Crillege of Law. He said, you know, if you 
14 don't like how things are or you disagree with it, pass 
15 a law. So, I think that's really what we're talking 
16 about and so I'm going to grant, uh, Mr. Amstad's Motion 
17 to Dismiss and, uh, we'll see what happens. The State, 
18 I expect, will likely appeal this decision and maybe we 
19 can get some clarification from a higher court, maybe 
20 starting with Judge Stegner, maybe the-- maybe the 
21 Supreme Court or maybe the legislature will intervene in 
22 the next legislative session. 
23 I think, honestly, part of the problem is the 
24 subsequent passage of, uh, thirty-seven-- what is it? 
25 Thirty-seven - twenty-- thirty-seven - twenty-seven 
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1 thirty seven A, which then specifically dealt with motor 
2 vehicles in this-- in this same context, in this same 






So, there you have it. Any questions? 
MR. UGELSTAD: No, Your Honor. 
MS. HUNTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. Thank you all. Good 
9 [WHEREUPON THE HEARING WAS RECESSED AT 4:28 
10 P.M., RECONVENING AT 4:28 P.M., COURT, COUNSEL AND THE 
11 DEFENDANT BEING PERSONALLY PRESENT AS BEFORE.] 
12 THE COURT: Uh, so, this is just based upon, 
13 uh, the, uh, findings and reasoning set forth in-- on 
14 the record. Uh, the order[sic] to dismiss is granted. 
15 
16 
MR. UGELSTAD: Thank you, Judge. 
MS. HUNTER: Oh, okay. I don't have to go 





THE COURT: No. 
MS. HUNTER: Okay. 
THE COURT: No. Because they can-- they're 
21 going to have to do a transcript anyway. 
22 
23 
MS. HUNTER: Okay, great. Okay. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual Background 
-
On January 30, 2017, at about 10:40 p.m., Officer Joe Sieverding (Sieverding) noticed 
a Honda Accord with fogged windows parked in the west Wallace Complex parking lot on the 
University ofldaho Campus in Moscow, Idaho. Dismissal Hearing ("DH") at 9: 23-25, 10: 1-6. 
Sieverding approached the car on foot, and from about five feet away from the Honda, he 
smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. DH at 10:19-25, 11: 1-2. The 
vehicle was not running and he walked up and knocked on the passenger window. DH: 7-8. 
Daniel Amstad (Amstad/Defendant) opened the passenger door. DH at 12: 2. Sieverding could 
see the driver, C.H., a juvenile, hide a plastic baggie under his seat. DH at 11: 11-12. C.H. also 
had what appeared to be marijuana flakes on his lap. DH at 11: 12-15. Sieverding asked C.H. 
where the marijuana was and C.H. handed him a small sandwich bag from under the seat 
containing marijuana. DH at 12: 19-20. Sieverding then asked what they used to smoke the 
marijuana with and C.H. handed him a large glass bong from the back seat. DH at 12:23-25. 
Sieverding then asked the occupants to step outside of the vehicle while he conducted a 
search. DH at 13: 3-5. During the search, Sieverding found a one gallon sized Ziploc bag with 
approximately 46.5g of marijuana and a large quantity of new, plastic Ziploc bags in the trunk, 
along with various paraphernalia. DH at 13: 7-14. Before the search ended, CH. also pulled a 
digital scale from his pocket and handed it to a covering officer. DH at 13:15-17. After the 
investigation was complete, Sieverding cited Amstad with a violation of LC. § 37-2732(d), 
which is commonly referred to as Frequenting. DH at 15:18. 
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Procedural Background 
Toe Defendant was charged with Frequenting, Idaho Code§ 37-27329(d). He pled 
"Not Guilty" and moved to dismiss the case. On April 27, 2017 the magistrate court heard 
evidence and oral arguments on the matter. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate 
stated his factual findings and conclusions of law on the record, and dismissed the case. 
On April 28, 2017, the magistrate filed a written Order Dismissing Case. Toe State 
timely appealed on May 10, 2017. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The State raises the following issue on appeal: 
Did the magistrate err in determining that the west Wallace Complex parking lot 
belonging to the University ofidaho is not "the premises of any place" under I.C; § 
37-2732(d)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW-
The District Court hears appeals from the magistrate division in the same manner and 
on the same standards as an appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court. I.C.R. 
54(f)(l). While a Motion to Dismiss under I.C.R 48(a) is typically reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed by an appellate court as 
de novo. State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (2012); State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 
863, 865 (2011). 
ARGUMENT 
The magistrate erred in determining that a parking lot is not the premises of any place 
because the plain meaning of "premises" is a tract of land. The parking lot at issue in this case 
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is a tract of land belonging to the University ofldaho. Under Idaho Code 37-2737(d) it is 
unlawful for any person: 
" ... to be present at or on the premises of any place where he 
knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or 
cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, 
delivery, administration, use, or to be given away." 
(Emphasis Added). While there are several elements that the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for a person to be guilty under this statute, the only element the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss challenged was the element emphasized above. Thus, at issue 
in this case is the meaning of "premises" and the rules of statutory interpretation as applied to 
LC. § 37-2732(d). 
In order to determine this issue, the Idaho Supreme Court employs the following 
principles of statutory interpretation: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive 
the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the 
statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must 
be interpreted in the context of the entire document. The 
statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and 
provisions of the statute so that none will be void, 
superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative 
body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider 
rules of statutory construction." 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) quoting Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 
Idaho 307, 310 (2009) (internal citations omitted). The State's position in this case is that the 
statute is unambiguous and must be construed as a whole, giving all the words in the statute 
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plain, usual, and ordinary meaning in accordance with Schulz. 
First, the statute uses the phrase "present at or on" indicating that there is a difference 
from being "at" the premises of any place or "on" the premises of any place. The State's 
position is that one can be "at" a premises without being "on" a preJ:?ises. In our case, the 
Defendant was not physically standing "on" the parking lot, but was "at" the parking lot by 
sitting in the Honda Accord; the vehicle was "on" the parking lot. A reading of the statute that 
would allow for a safe haven of sitting in one's vehicle on a tract ofland, and thus, not falling 
within the purview of LC. § 37-2732(d), renders the word "at" a nullity or superfluous. 
Because none of the statute is to be construed as a nullity or superfluous under Schulz, one 
can be "at" a premises without being "on" the premises. 
Second, the State does not disagree with the definitions given on the record by the 
magistrate, but with the application of the facts to those definitions. A premises is "a tratt of 
land with the buildings thereon." "premises." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com (5 Aug. 2017). Here, the University ofldaho dormitory 
parking lot is a tract of land without buildings or structures. University of Idaho is presumably 
responsible for-its upkeep and any premises liability. The parking lot is a premises by its plain 
· meaning in accordance with the principles listed in Schulz. Simply because there are no 
buildings on this particular area of University of Idaho's land does not mean that the parking 
lot is not a premises within the meaning of the LC. § ·37-2732(d). 
Additionally, the following hypothetical will help to illustrate the error in the 
magistrate's holding in this case: A farmer owns Blackacre and uses the parcel to grow 
marijuana. There are no structures, outbuildings, or fences on Blackacre. If a person were 
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sitting in an automobile directly across the street from Blackacre watching the farmer tend the 
marijuana crop, that person would not be in violation ofl.C. § § 37-2732(d). However, if that 
same individual were to drive across the street onto Blackacre and discuss marijuana prices 
with the farmer from the front seat of his car, that person would now be present at or on the 
premises of any place where he knows marijuana is cultivated. Again, there are no buildings, 
but the marijuana farm in this hypothetical is still a premises within the meaning of the 
statute. Additionally, the hypothetical person was in a vehicle at the time of the violation, yet 
was "present at or on" Blackacre. 
Third, a holistic reading ofl.C. § 37-2732(d) shows that the statute is very broad in 
encompassing all places. The operative words of the statute, "any place," indicate the 
legislature's intent to criminalize the conduct of a person who is present anywhere he knows 
controlled substances are being used, cultivated, distributed, transported, or given away. The 
Defendant in our case was present where marijuana was potentially being used, distributed, 
transported, or given away. Because the record is void of the Defendant's knowledge or 
intent, the sole issue of the Defendant's presence at a premises should have be ruled as 
undisputable and the Motion to Dismiss based solely on the Defendant's presence at the 
parking lot should have been denied by the magistrate. 
The magistrate erred in holding that the University of Idaho's parking lot serving the 
west Wallace Complex dormitory is not a premises of any place under LC. § 3 7-2732( d). The 
plain, usual, and ordinary meanings of the statute indicate a person can be "at" a premises 
without being "on" it, that premises includes a parking lot, and the statute is broad enough to 
condemn the course of conduct described in the statute at any place. 




Because Defendant only challenged the singular element of "present at or on the 
premises of any place", and the course of conduct describe on the record falls within I. C. § 
37-2732(d), the magistrate abused his discretiond in dismissing this case under I.C.R 48(a)(2). 
The State requests that the Order Dismissing Case be reversed and this case be remanded for 
further proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent agrees with the Factual Background and Procedural Background set forth in 
the Appellant's Statement of the Case in Appellant's Brief, filed herein August 7, 2017. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is de novo. State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 778, (2012); 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011). 
ARGUMENT 
The magistrate did not en- in detem1ining that the parking lot in this case was not the 
premises of any place under Idaho Code 37-2732(d). Appellant argues that since the parking lot 
belonged to the University ofldaho, it is the premises of a place, the university. Idaho Code 
37-2732(d), which reads that it is unlawful for a person "to be present at or on the premises of 
any place where he lmows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or . 
are being held for distribution, transportation, deEvery, administration, or to be given away." 
Should the University of Idaho be considered "a place" and every parking lot and tract of land 
maintained by the university a "premises" of that place, then only the naive would be truly safe 
from a charge under this statute, as there is certainly marijuana being used or held somewhere on 
the campus. This is an overbroad interpretation of "the premises of any place," and would render 
the statute overbroad and absurd. 
While the Respondent agrees that the Court must follow the principles of statutory 
interpretation under State v. Schulz, and "must give effect to all words and provisions of the 
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statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant," 151 Idaho 866-67 (2011 ), the 
Respondent does not agree that '"at" would be rendered a nullity under the magistrate's 
interpretation of the statute. The Respondent does not agree that you can be "at" the premises of 
any place and not be "on" the premises of any place. The phrase "present at or on" included both 
"at" or "on" to be able to describe places and objects. For example, a person is generally 
described to be "at" the mall, but "on" the mall's property. If the legislature wanted to· 
specifically include cars as a place for a person to be subject to this code section, they might 
have used the word "in," or even '·automobile." 
The Appellant argues that the statute was written to be very broad. While the statute may 
be broad, it is not broad enough to include automobiles. In another similar statute, Idaho Code 
37-2737 A, which prohibits manufacturing or delivering controlled substances upon the same 
premises as a minor, the statute defines "premises" for the purpose of that section as including a 
motor vehicle or vessel. If the legislature wanted to include motor vehicles in the definition of 
Idaho Code 37-2732(d), they would have. They were careful enough to broaden the definition of 
"premises" to protect children from being exposed to drug trafficking, and if they were 
concerned enough with charging college students for being in the same car as their friends who 
possessed marijuana, they would have been careful enough to broaden the definition for 
"premises" under the so-called frequenting statute as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate did not abuse his discretion in dismissing this case under I.C.R. 48(a)(2). 
Therefore, the Order Dismissing Case should be affi1111ed. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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- COUR',[' MINUTES -
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District Judge 
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DANIEL C. AMSTAD, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording: Z: 3/2017-10-30 
Time: 9:33 A.M. 
Case No. CR-2017-230 
Appearances: 
Keith Scholl, Deputy Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 
Defendant present with counsel, 
Andrea Hunter, Public Defender 
Subject of Proceedings: APPELLATE ARGUMENT 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for the hearing of 
appellate argument in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the 
defendant. 
Mr. Scholl presented appellate argument on behalf of the State/Appellant. Ms. 
Hunter presented appellate argument on behalf of the defendant/respondent. Mr. 
Scholl argued in rebuttal. Ms. Hunter argued in surrebuttal. 
For reasons articulated on the record, Court affirmed the magistrate's ruling in 
this case. 
Court recessed at 10:05 A.M. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
) 
STATE OF.IDAHO, ) Case No. CR-2017-230 
) 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, ) 
) MEMORANDUM OPINION 
vs. ) ONAPPEAL 
) 
DANIEL C. AMSTAD, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) ________________) . 
In this case, the Magistrate Judge, John C. Judge, dismissed the criminal 
charge of "frequenting"1 brought against the Defendant Daniel C. Amstad. The 
State appeals the Magistrate's decision. For the reasons set out in this opinion, the 
Magistrate's dismissal of the charge will be affirmed. 
1 The charge is colloquially referred to as "frequenting" because that was the language used in the 
statute when it was originally enacted in 1972. 1972 Idaho Sess. Law Ch. 133 § 6, p. 27 4. However, 
the statute was amended in 1977 and the frequenting language was deleted. 1977 Idaho Sess. Law 
Ch. 185 § 1, p. 517. Nevertheless, the frequenting moniker has remained, even though it is now a 
misnomer. The current statute, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d), crin:i.inalizes being present "at or on 
premises of any place" where controlled substances are being held and the defendant knows of that 
fact. 
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On January 20, 2017, an officer with the Moscow Police Department, Joe 
Sieverding, noticed a car parked in the parking lot near the Wallace Complex on the 
campus of the University of Idaho. The car's windows were fogged over. It is not · 
clear from the record whether the car, a Honda, was running. As the Officer 
approached, he smelled the aroma of marijuana. He knocked on the passenger door. 
The Defendant, Daniel Amstad, opened the door and there ih the lap of the driver, 
C.H.,2 was a baggie containing what the officer believed to be marijuana. Amstad · 
was charged with violating Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d). The allegation being that he 
was "present at or on premises of any place where he [knew] illegal controlled 
substances [were] ... being held ..... " 
Amstad moved to dismiss the charge, arguing ''[a] vehicle is not a 'premises of 
any place."' Mot. to Dismiss at 2. In support of his motion, Amstad's attorney 
attached two decisions: Memorandum Opinion Concerning Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal and Motion to Suppress Evidence, State v. Traveller, Twin Falls County · 
Case No. CR-2008-215 (M:ay 8, 2008); and Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss, State 
v. Reid, Bonneville County Case No. CR-2014-3601 (July 30, 2014); in which, under 
similar, although not identical circumstances, magistrate judges in two different 
counties (Twin Falls and Bonneville) concluded that a vehicle was not the premises 
of any place and dismissed the charges. (Amstad also attached the analysis of Pierce 
2 C.H. are the initials of the driver who was a minor at the time of the incident The initials C.H. are being 
used.to protect the minor's identity. 
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Murphy, the Community Ombudsman of Boise City in which the Ombudsman came 
to .the same conclusion, that a car did not fall within the ambit of the statute. 
However, as noted at oral argument, the Ombudsman's analysis has no legal effect 
on this Court's analysis.) 
On appeal, the State characterizes the issue as follows: "Did the magistrate 
err in determining that the west Wallace Complex parking lot belonging to the 
University of Idaho is not 'the premises of any place' under LC.§ 37-2732(d)?" 
Appellant's Brief at 4. While Judge Judge spoke in terms of the applicability of the 
statute to the parking lot (see Tr. of Hearing of Mot_. to Dismiss (Tr.) p. 67, lines 10-
13 ("I am not finding that a parking lot, even though it might be associated with a 
dorm which houses many, many.people, can be considered a premises.'')) those were 
not the facts presented to Judge Judge, and therefore did not constitute the holding 
of the case. 
The transcript makes it clear that Amstad was apprehended while sitting in 
tne passenger seat of a car while C.H., the person vyho had physical possession of 
the marijuana, sat in the driver's seat. Tr. p. 11. The issue presented to Judge 
Judge by Amstad was as follows: 
A vehicle is not a "premises of any place."_ When in a vehicle, one 
is not "present at or on premises of any place." Therefore, criminal 
liability does not attach under that statute when one is a passenger in 
a vehicle in which drugs are present. 
Mot. to Dismiss at 2. In its response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the State 
succinctly articulated the issue facing Judge Judge: "The question presented to this 
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Court is whether a person can be 'present at or on the premises of any place' if they 
· [sic] are in a vehicle." Response to Defendant's Mot. to Dismiss at 3. 
To now attempt to change the issue as being a question about a parking lot 
when the facts are undisputed and the existing law analyzed dealt with a person's 
presence in a car is to engage in sophistry. This Court will consider the question 
presented as it was by the State's attorney when this matter was presented to 
Judge Judge - "The question presented to this Court is whether a person can be 
'present a tor on the premises of any place' if they [sic] are in a vehicle." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for this Court, in its appellate capacity, in 
interpreting a statute is well,settled: 
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction 
of statutes. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging 
in statutory construction. The language of the statute is to be given its 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative 
history or rules of statutory interpretation. When this Court must 
engage in statutory construction because an ambiguity exists, it has 
. the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that 
intent. To ascertain such intent, not only must the literal words of the 
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public 
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is incumbent 
upon a court to give an ambiguous statute an interpretation that will 
not render it a nullity. Constructions of an ambiguous statute that 
would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. Addition.ally, if a 
criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the 
statute must be construed in favor of the accused. However, where a 
review of the legislative history makes the meaning of the statute 
clear, the rule of lenity will not be applied. 
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State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 439-40, 313 P.3d 765, 767-68 (Ct. App. 2013) 
(citations omitted). "Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the 
statute, and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. 
The objective of statutory interpretation-is to give effect to legislative intent. Such 
intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue." State v. McKean, 
159 Idaho 75, 79, 356 P.3d 368, 372 (2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
The operative question presented in this case is what did the legislature 
intend when it used the phrase "at or on premises of any place ... "? The State seeks 
to prosecute Amstad contending that his presence in a car with another occupant 
who had marijuana in his possession constitutes what the legislature sought to 
proscribe. 
As a threshold matter, it is clear that the definition of premises does not 
include a car. Black's Law Dictionary defines premises as follows: "[a] house or 
building, along with its grounds; esp., the buildings and land that a shop, 
restaurant, company, etc. uses." PREMISES, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014). 
Idaho's case law also distinguishes "premises" from a vehicle. See, for 
example, State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 982 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1999) in which the 
Court of Appeals concluded that a search warrant authorizing a search of a truck 
and a bus did not include the search of "premises." Schaffer, 133 Idaho at 133, 982 
P.2d at 968. As noted by the Court of Appeals, "[i]n the instant case, by contrast, the 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
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search warrant authorized the search of only a truck and a bus located in the 
backyard of a house. There was no authorization to search any 'premises.'" Id. 
It could also be argued that "premises" modified by the phrase "of any place" 
could arguably include a car. However, in order to reach such a conclusion after 
having found premises does not include a· car would require interpreting "place" as 
including a vehicle. After reviewing the definition of "place" such an argument fails. 
"Place" is defined as follows: 
This word is a very indefinite term. It is applied to any locality, limited 
by boundaries, however large or however small. It may be used to 
designate a country, state, county, town, or a very small portion of a 
town. The extent of the locality designated by it must generally be 
determined by the connection in which it is used. In its primary ancl 
most general sense means locality, situation; or site, and it is also used 
to designate an occupied situation or building. 
· PLACE, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).3 Suffice to say, the defi_nition of 
"place" does not include a parked Honda. 
Having concluded that neither "premises" nor "place" refer to a parked car, it 
appears the legislature did not intend to criminalize Amstad's activity on January 
13, 2017; in its use of the language employed. 
Even though the definitions of premises and place do appear to not include a 
car, the State argues the legislature should be given latitude when it comes to the 
use of its chosen language. Several considerations suggest otherwise. In reading the 
statute, it seems ambiguous on its face. It is difficult to glean what the legislature 
3 Apparently, the term "place" has been removed from Black's Law Dictionary by the Seventh Edition 
(1999), and remains absent from the Tenth Addition (2014). See Black's Law Dictionary at 1169 (7th ed. 
1999). 
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intended by simply reading the statute. In an effort to understand the legislative 
intent, it is helpful to examine the statute in context. In doing so, it becomes 
apparent that the legislature has specifically defined "premises" elsewhere in the 
Idaho Code as including a "motor vehicle." I refer to Idaho Code § 37-2737 A in 
which the legislature defined "premises" to mean "[m]otor vehicle or vessel .... " 
LC.§ 37-2737A(2). In the statute here being interpreted, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d), 
the legislature could have, but chose not to use that definition. The conclusion to 
draw from this difference is that the legislature did not intend to include a "motor 
vehicle" within its definition of premises or to proscribe this behavior in the statute 
in question. The legislature could have expanded the definition of premises to bring 
it into congruence with the more expansive definition of Idaho Code§ 37-2737A. It 
did not and has not. Consequently, in comparing Idaho Code§ 37-2732(d) with 
Idaho Code§ 37-2737A, it appears the legislature did not intend to criminalize 
Amstad's behavior. 
The second consideration militating in favor of the Defendant is the principle 
oflenity. 
[I]f a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the 
statute must be construed in favor of the accused. However, where a 
review of the legislative history and underlying public policy makes the 
meaning of the statute clear, the rule of lenity will not apply. If the 
ambiguity remains after examining the text, context, history, and 
policy of the statute, the interpretive tie between the two or more 
reasonable readings is resolved in favor of the defendant. 
State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 969, 318 P.3d 955, 959 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations 
omitted). As explained, the plain text chosen by the legislature does not appear to 
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include a car within its coverage. Nevertheless, the State urges that "premises" be 
given an unconventional and expansive definition. As no~ed, the legislature 
recognized in a differenfcode section that when it wanted "premises" to include a 
"[m]otor.vehicle" it defined premises as including a motor vehicle. Because the 
legislature chose not to do so, it should be assumed that this expansive definition 
was not intended by the legislature. Given the ambiguity mentioned, applying the 
rule oflenity is appropriate in this case. Consequently, the statute should be 
construed in favor of the accused. In matters of statutory construction, the tie does 
· not go to the legislature. I~ goes to the defendant. Affording Amstad the r1:1-le of 
lenity also leads to the conclusion that an expansive definition of premises would be 
inappropriate. 
Finally, the fact that every court that has been asked to look at this statute 
has come to a similar interpretation lends support to the conclusion that the statute 
does not stand for the proposition urged by the State. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Magistrate Judge in dismissing the. charge against Daniel 
Anis tad is AFFIRMED. 
. 5r . 
Dated this _\_ day of December 2017. 
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Andrea Hunter 
Attorney for Defendant I Respondent 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
John C. Judge 
Magistrate Judge 
Latah County District Court 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Thomas D: Kershaw, Jr. 
Magistrate Judge 
Twin Falls County District Court 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0126 
Fax: (208) 736-4155 
Stephen J. Clark 
Magistrate Judge 
Bonneville County District Court 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 529-1300 
on this t 5j- day of December 2017. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
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l)eputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83720 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR LATAH COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) District Court Case No, CR-2017-230 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
V. ) 
DANIEL C. AMSTAD, ) 
) 
) ____________ ) 
TO: DANIEL C. AMSTAD, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, ANDREAS. 
HUNTER, P. 0. BOX 9408, MOSCOW, ID 83843 AND·. THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT:. . 
Defendant-Respondent. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the MEMORANDUM OPINION ON APPEM,, 
entered in the above-entitled· action on tb.e-1 st day of December, 2017, the Honorable John R 
Stegner presiding. A copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-PAGE 1 
! 
000180 
VO.II, L•LV1v ~·,, -
. 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme· Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appeal.able orders under and pursuant to 
Rule l l(c)(lO), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Did the district court err by 
affirming the magistrate's dismissal of the char$e of frequenting? 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been sealed. 
5. The appellant requests the preparation of the foUowing portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
No additional transcripts are requested. The stafe requests that all transcripts prepared foe 
the appeal to the district court from the magistrate division be included in the record. 
6. Appellant requests the nonnal clerk's record pursuantto Rule 28, I.A.R. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy ofthis notice of appeal is not being served on a court reporter 
because no additional transcripts are requested; ·· 
(b) That arrangements have been made with the Latah County Prosecuting 
Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript if one should be 
requested in the future; 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the . 
· preparation of the record beca1:13e the State ofldaho is the appellant (Idaho Code§ 31-3212); 
( d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal 
case (I.AR. 23(a)(8)); 
( e) · That service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant· 
to RuJe 20, I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 2 
000181. 
V 0. ti, '-' I... V 1 V -... • , , 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2018. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for the Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 3 
000182 
VO.II• L•LVIV .... ,, -,. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of January, 2018, cau&ed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
THE HONORABLE JOHN R. STEGNER 
Latah County District Court 
P. 0. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
WILLIAM W, 1HOMPSON 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
P, 0. Box 8068 · 
Moscow, ID 83 843 
KEITH SCHOLL 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
P. 0. Box 8068 
Moscow,'ID. 83843 
ANDREAS. HUNTER 
· P. 0. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
HAND DELIVERY 
KAREL A. LEHRMAN 
ACTING CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
K.KJ/dd 
KENNETH K. JORGENS 
Deputy Attorney General 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 












Supreme Court Docket No. 45707 
Latah Co. Case No. CR-2017-0230 
I, Tonya Dodge, Deputy Court Oerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
transcript in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, 
full, complete and correct transcript of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required 
under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above entitled cause will be 
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the court reporter's transcript and the 
clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Moscow, Idaho this~ day of Ie_w~ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
2018. 
Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 













Supreme Court Docket No. 45707 
Latah Co. Case No. CR-2017-0230 
I, Tonya Dodge, Deputy Court Oerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that there 
were no exhibits presented in this case. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have h~nd and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this ~ day of - , 2018. 
Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By bU~-
Deputyk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 











CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Supreme Court Docket No. 45707 
Latah Co. Case No. CR-2017-0230 
I, Tonya Dodge, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by United States 
mail, one copy of the Reporter's Transcripts and Clerk's Record to each of the attorneys of record in 
this cause as follows: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POBOX83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
ANDREAS. HUNER 
POBOX9408 
MOSCOW, ID 83841 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Moscow, Idaho this ~day of ~ k)v1A 04 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Henrianne K. Westberg, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By -~-e,.,,._p......,.u~~.,.,.,.r~k-· ---
